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1 Introduction
This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of cuts to income tax rates in an economy when
the government follows a balanced budget fiscal rule and keeps money supply constant, and
private agents face constraints on the ability to finance investments. The tax rate cuts are
unexpected, exogenous, simultaneous, and temporary. The main results are that the tax cuts
increase output, private consumption, and investment; the increases in output and consumption
are significant and long-lasting; and the liquidity constraints play a major role in the shock’s
long-term persistence. Liquidity constraints create demands for two assets of varying liquidity;
tax cuts increase the demand for both assets; and while the tax cuts also lead to an increase
in supply of the less liquid asset, the liquidity constraints restrict this increase to be small; ac-
cordingly, both asset prices increase, and amplify the internal propagation of the shock. Results
are obtained from calibrating a modified version of the DSGE model of liquidity and business
cycles by Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) (henceforth KM). The modifications are twofold: (i) dis-
tortionary taxes to labour and dividend incomes are added, and (ii) the government follows a
balanced budget fiscal rule and keeps money supply constant. Results are qualitatively robust,
but quantitatively sensitive, to assumptions regarding structural parameter values, and qualita-
tively and quantitatively sensitive to significant variations in the persistence of tax shocks. The
paper contributes to an extensive literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy for economic
stimulation. It belongs to a narrow strand of this literature which explores balanced budget ex-
pansion. Results are consistent with those achieved by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) (henceforth
MU) , a member of this balanced budget research.
Tax cuts are shown to be expansionary in early works by Andersen and Jordan (1968),
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Baxter and King (1993), Braun (1994), McGrattan (1994), Alesina
and Perotti (1997), and Perotti (1999), and more recently by Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens
and Ravn (2011a,b, 2012), and Monacelli et al. (2012). Support for tax cuts is also expressed
in blogs by Hall and Woodford (2008), Bils and Klenow (2008), Mankiw (2008), and Barro
(2009). And counterfactual experiments by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and Romer
(2010), MU, and Alesina and Ardagna (2010) show that tax cuts produce larger responses than
increases in government spending.
Tax cuts with a balanced budget are shown to be expansionary in Eggertsson (2010) and
MU. Eggertsson (2010) obtains his results by cutting consumption taxes and simultaneously
raising income and wealth taxes to perfectly compensate. MU show that completely financing
an unexpected, exogenous increase in government spending with an increase in taxation causes
reductions in private consumption and investment on impact, as well as in output from the
second period.1 The converse of this result suggests a recipe for debt-free economic expansion.
This paper complements MU by showing that the converse of their result is also true. The
novelty of this paper is that while MU obtain their results from an empirical study with vector
autoregressions, this paper is a theoretical investigation using a mostly neoclassical DSGE
model.
The KM model is chosen for its pair of financial frictions, which resemble an essential
1There is, however, a small increase in output on impact, with a multiplier of 1.3.
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feature of the 2007/8 financial crisis. This makes the paper relevant for policy discussions on
the crisis. KM is an otherwise neoclassical model, but with constraints on firms’ ability to
internally and externally finance investments. Commentators argue that the cause of the crisis
was the sudden and unexpected deterioration in the value of partially liquid private financial
assets, which thus ruined their resaleability and suitability for use as collateral (Brunnermeier
(2009), Del Negro et al. (2011), Bigio (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). Assets’
resaleability and suitability for collateral were thus adversely affected. This event bears a
striking resemblance to KM’s own negative liquidity shock.
The KM model is theoretically adjusted and/or extended in a series of recent papers. These
papers can be classified into two groups. The first group uses the KM model to evaluate the
unconventional policies seen in the crisis; Del Negro et al. (2011) and Driffill and Miller (2013)
are members of this research, and both show that recessions would have been exacerbated had
it not been for government interventions. The second KM-related group returns to the original
questions posed by KM on the importance of (i) liquidity shocks for explaining business cycles,
and (ii) liquidity constraints for the propagation of productivity shocks. Papers in this group
include Salas-Landeau (2010), Bigio (2010, 2012), Ajello (2011), Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), Shi
(2012), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
The inclusion of distortionary taxes and a balanced budget rule is not unique in KM-related
literature. Ajello (2011), Shi (2012), and Driffill and Miller (2013) have a balanced budget
rule for government. Ajello (2011) also includes distortionary taxes, but he modifies the KM
model more extensively than in this paper. The uniqueness of this contribution is that it is the
first to examine fiscal shocks in the KM model. What is shares with these papers, the second
KM-related group in particular, is showing the macroeconomic significance of KM’s liquidity
constraints in propagating exogenous shocks. In this case, however, the shocks are to tax rates.
In a wider literature, the significance of this paper is that it shows how a neoclassical model
can be modified to produce large responses to fiscal shocks. The New Keynesian model is the
workhorse for fiscal policy research. This perhaps follows from papers like Burnside et al. (2004),
which shows that the magnitude of observed responses to fiscal shocks are not matched by a
standard neoclassical models, but they are matched by models that include habit formation and
adjustment costs. Beyond the liquidity constraints, this model is otherwise neoclassical. This
paper therefore shows that a host of New Keynesian frictions are not always needed to study
fiscal policy. The KM model can be a workhorse for that purpose.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model in full, and
derives conditions which characterize the dynamic equilibrium; Section 3 presents the main
results of the tax shock; Section 4 quantifies and comments on the magnitude of shock responses
using tax multipliers; Section 5 briefly gives the conclusions of sensitivity analysis on structural
parameters and the persistence of tax shocks; Section 6 examines the significance of the results
by relating them to similar work in the literature; and Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines
avenues for future research. The technical appendix contains the model’s calibration, sensitivity
analysis of the shock, algebra of proofs and derivations, an algebraic solution for steady state,
and the data used in the paper.
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2 The model
This section defines agents’ behaviour and derives conditions that characterize the dynamic
equilibrium. The model is an adaption of the Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) framework with
government and without storage. Modifications are twofold: (i) distortionary taxes on wage
and dividend income are added, and (ii) different policy rules to the ones in KM are assumed.2
In particular, the government holds no equity, keeps money supply constant, and adheres to a
balanced fiscal budget rule. To make the paper self-contained, a full description of the model
is given. Appendix C contains detailed algebra associated with derivations, simplifications, and
proofs.
2.1 The environment
The economy exists over an infinite horizon of discrete time periods. It is populated by three
groups of infinitely-lived agents: entrepreneurs, workers, and a government. There is no popu-
lation growth or decline, and the economy is closed to the rest of the world. Agents produce
and consume a perishable general output, which also serves as the numeraire. They also ex-
change labour and two assets, equity and money. All markets are competitive and prices are
perfectly flexible. There are no financial intermediaries; instead, agents borrow directly from
other agents. The economy is also subject to random, stochastic shocks.
2.1.1 Entrepreneurs
There is a unit-mass continuum of entrepreneurs. At the start of each period all entrepreneurs
are identical. They are the exclusive owners of capital and a homogeneous technology that
produces the general output good with guaranteed success. At the beginning of period t the
representative entrepreneur owns kt units of capital and employs lt hours of labour, and produces
yt units of general output at the end of the period according to
yt = Atk
γ
t l
1−γ
t (2.1)
where At is a common level of total factor productivity and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital elasticity
of output, which, given that the output market is perfectly competitive and the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale, is also the share of output accruing to capital. The
entrepreneur pays workers wt units of general output for each labour-hour employed. The
quantity of general output left over is the return on the capital used in production; in other
words, each unit of capital used in production receives rt units of general output as gross profit,
where
rtkt = yt − wtlt (2.2)
Capital depreciates during the production process, and a fraction, δ, of its stock survives to the
end of the period when production is complete.
2KM have two policy rules. One prevents government’s expenditure from exploding, by limiting it to the
deviation of their asset holdings from steady state. The other, for open market operations, limits the ratio of
current to steady state government equity holdings to a weighted sum of productivity and liquidity impulse
responses.
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Some time soon after the start of the period, a fraction, pi, of entrepreneurs gain access to a
homogenous investment technology that converts a unit of general output into a unit of capital
with guaranteed success. Entrepreneurs are therefore identical ex ante to when investment
opportunities are revealed. pi is independently and identically distributed across time and
entrepreneurs. Who gets an opportunity to invest is exogenously determined. Those without
investment opportunities carry on with what they have been doing since the start of the period,
i.e. producing, consuming, and saving (by purchasing assets); they are the period’s “savers”.
Those with investment opportunities are the period’s “investors”, and once their behaviour
changes to pursue such opportunities. The investment technology is unrestricted in capacity,
but its access expires at the end of the period. Afterwards, investors and savers revert to being
ex ante identical from the start of the next period.
The production and installation of new capital takes an entire period, so a typical investor
who invests it units of general output has an end-of-period capital stock
kt+1 = δkt + it
To acquire general output for investment, an investor issues new units of equity at the market
price. Each of these units has a claim on the future gross profits that it contributed towards
creating, i.e. each unit of equity earns rt in dividends after period t’s production is complete.
But equity depreciates in tandem with its underlying capital. Any agent is free to buy equity.
An entrepreneur’s holdings of equity issued by other entrepreneurs is called his “outside” equity.
The entrepreneur possesses special skills which are costly to replicate and replace. Once an
investment project is underway, his human resource is needed for the entire duration to ensure
the full amount of new capital is produced. The entrepreneur, however, cannot pre-commit
to being involved with the project to its end. Instead, he can guarantee that he will remain
with the project for no more than an exogenously determined fraction, θ, of its duration. This
implies that he can guarantee a maximum of θ of an investment’s new capital will be produced,
which further implies that he can guarantee a maximum of θ of new output in the next period
when the new capital is put to work. Consequently, the investing entrepreneur can credibly
raise no more than θ of his investment cost from equity funding. This limitation is called the
“borrowing” constraint, and has its origins in Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997).3
The entrepreneur can internally finance his investment by selling his stock of outside equity.
However, the entrepreneur cannot sell all of his outside equity before the window of investment
opportunity closes. Instead, he can liquidate up to a fraction, φt, of his holdings. This limitation
is called the “resaleability” constraint, and is an exogenous feature of the model.
Borrowing and resaleability constraints are together called “liquidity” constraints. The fi-
3An alternative interpretation of θ is constructed by Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007): the entrepreneur can
“run away” with a fraction, (1−θ), of the value of his capital at any time, simply because capital is always under
his complete control. In models with formal credit markets, unlike this one, θ is featured as a credit market
friction: due to a limited ability by lenders to enforce loan contracts, lenders request collateral, and lend at most
a fraction, θ, of the value of collateralized assets. The credit market friction is its more common representation,
owing to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who show its macroeconomic significance, and to Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) who introduce it into dynamic macroeconomic models.
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nancing gap they leave is met by the entrepreneur’s stock of a perfectly liquid, government-issued
fiat money. While money is intrinsically worthless, its demand is motivated by a precaution
against falling short in financing investment opportunities. Moreover, the tighter the liquidity
constraints, i.e. the smaller the values of θ and φt, the greater the need to internally finance
investments, and the greater the desire to hold money balances (and conversely). That part of
a project that the entrepreneur funds from his own money is called his “inside equity”. It is
assumed that inside and outside equity are perfect substitutes, having the same resaleability
constraint and providing the same rate of return. Inside and outside equity are therefore col-
lectively referred to as “equity”. Equity and money are traded in competitive markets at prices
qt and pt, respectively, both expressed in terms of general output.
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For an investment opportunity requiring it units of general output, an entrepreneur will
issue it units of equity. By the borrowing constraint, only a maximum of θit will be sold, and
the investor must therefore retain at least (1− θ)it as new inside equity. The investor will then
liquidate existing equity holdings which have since depreciated. If the entrepreneur holds nt
units of equity at the start of period t then a maximum of φtδnt units can be sold, and the
entrepreneur is left with at least (1 − φt)δnt units. The entrepreneur also holds mt units of
money at the start of the period, which cannot be lent or used as collateral. His equity and
money holdings at the end of the period are therefore given by
nt+1 ≥ (1− θ)it + (1− φt)δnt (2.3)
mt+1 ≥ 0 (2.4)
The gross profit paid to capital at the end of the period represents a dividend payment to
the holder of the equity claim on capital. Therefore, an entrepreneur who owns nt units of
equity at the start of the period earns rtnt in gross dividends over the period. He pays a tax on
dividend income to the government at a rate of τ rnt . His net dividend income is then allocated
to consumption and saving, and to investment if the opportunity exists.
An investor in period t consumes cit units of general output, invests it units, and saves by
acquiring (nit+1 − it − δnt) and (mit+1 −mt) units of equity and money, respectively, at their
market prices. The investor thus faces a budget constraint for period t,
cit + it + qt(n
i
t+1 − it − δnt) + pt(mit+1 −mt) = (1− τ rnt )rtnt (2.5)
A saver in period t consumes cst units of general output, and saves the rest of his net income
by purchasing (nst+1 − δnt) and (mst+1 −mt) units of equity and money, respectively, at their
market prices. The saver’s budget constraint for the period is
cst + qt(n
s
t+1 − δnt) + pt(mst+1 −mt) = (1− τ rnt )rtnt (2.6)
4In other words, qt and pt units of general output are exchanged for 1 unit of equity and money, respectively.
These are “real” prices. “Nominal” prices are the prices of a unit of general output and equity expressed in terms
of money, i.e. 1/pt and pt/qt, respectively. Inflation in the conventional sense is an increase in the nominal price
of general output, or equivalently, a fall in the real price of money (i.e. when a unit of money is exchanged for
fewer units of general output).
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The representative entrepreneur considers an expected lifetime discounted utility,
Et
 ∞∑
j=t
βj−tUe(cj)
 = Ue(ct) + Et[βUe(ct+1) + β2Ue(ct+2) + . . . ] (2.7)
where Et[·] is the expected value conditional on information available in period t, and β ∈ (0, 1)
is the subjective discount factor, or the inverse of the rate of time preference. The investor
maximizes Equation (2.7) subject to his budget constraint (2.5) and liquidity constraints (2.3)
and (2.4), while the saver maximizes Equation (2.7) subject to his budget constraint (2.6). Each
entrepreneur’s current utility is a natural logarithm of current consumption,
Ue(ct) ≡ ln ct
2.1.2 Workers
There is a unit-mass continuum of identical workers. They are the exclusive owners of labour.
They do not own capital or have investment opportunities. In period t each worker supplies
lwt hours of labour to entrepreneurs in exchange for a gross hourly wage of wt units of general
output. The worker then pays the government a tax on wage income at a rate of τwlt . The
worker holds two assets: nwt units of equity and m
w
t units of money. Each unit of equity earns
gross dividends of rt units of general output per period, depreciates at a constant rate of (1− δ)
per period, and is subject to the resaleability constraint, φt. Money does not have any of these
features. The worker pays the government a tax on dividend income at a rate of τ rnt . The
worker’s human resource is non-transferable across time. He therefore cannot borrow or have
negative net worth. His equity and money holdings are then always non-negative, i.e. for all t,
nwt ≥ 0 and mwt ≥ 0 (2.8)
The worker consumes cwt units of general output. The rest of his net income is saved by
purchasing (nwt+1 − δnwt ) and (mwt+1 − mwt ) units of equity and money, respectively, at their
prevailing market prices. His budget constraint is given by
cwt + qt(n
w
t+1 − δnwt ) + pt(mwt+1 −mwt ) = (1− τwlt )wtlwt + (1− τ rnt )rtnwt (2.9)
Subject to Equations (2.8) and (2.9), the worker maximises an expected lifetime discounted
utility,
Et
 ∞∑
j=t
βj−tUw(cwj , l
w
j )
 = Uw(cwt , lwt ) + Et[βUw(cwt+1, lwt+1) + β2Uw(cwt+2, lwt+2) + . . . ] (2.10)
The worker’s utility is additively separable in consumption and leisure,
Uw(c
w, lw) = cw − ω
1 + ν
(lw)1+ν
where ω is the relative weight of labour in utility and ν is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour
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supply.5
2.1.3 Government
The government is both the monetary and fiscal authority. It costlessly issues fiat money, which
it exchanges with the private sector for general output. By issuing (or withdrawing, respectively)
money over the period, it earns (or pays, respectively) pt(Mt+1 −Mt) units of general output,
where Mt and Mt+1 are the stocks of money in circulation at the start and end of the period,
respectively. Fiat money is the only liability of the government. The only asset it owns is a
stock of privately-issued equity. At the start of period t it holds Ngt units of equity, which earn
dividends at a rate of rt units of general output over the period, depreciate at a rate of (1− δ)
per period, and are subject to the resaleability constraint, φt. Equity holdings at the end of the
period are therefore lower bounded as
Ngt+1 ≥ (1− φt)δNgt (2.11)
The government holds equity for the conduct of open market operations (OMOs), in which
|Ngt+1 − δNgt | units are discretionately exchanged for money.
The government consumes Gt units of general output, and collects Tt in taxes from en-
trepreneurs and workers according to
Tt = τ
rn
t rtNt + τ
wl
t wtLt (2.12)
where Nt is the total private sector’s equity holdings at the beginning of period t, and Lt
is the aggregate number of labour hours used in the period’s production. The government’s
spending is assumed to not directly affect the utility of workers and entrepreneurs or create any
production externalities.6
The government balances its overall budget in every period. Therefore, its consumption and
net OMO purchases is financed from taxes, dividends, and seignorage, according to
Gt + qt(N
g
t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (2.13)
2.1.4 Exogenous variables
The economy is subject to exogenous stochastic shocks to {At, φt, Ngt ,Mt, τ rnt , τwlt }. These
variables evolve according to the same stationary AR(1) process,
At = (1− ρA)A+ ρAAt−1 + uAt (2.14)
φt = (1− ρφ)φ+ ρφφt−1 + uφt (2.15)
5Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012) point out that this utility specification is unusual in the RBC literature, but
shows that quantitative results are not sensitive to the choice of functional form. Alternative specifications are
the non-separable or log-separable form of King et al. (1988) and the form of Greenwood et al. (1988) whereby
disutility from work directly affects utility from consumption.
6Canova and Pappa (2011) note that if a change in government spending affects private agents’ utility (as
in Bouakez and Rebei (2007)) and/or creates production externalities (as in Baxter and King (1993)) then the
output response is amplified.
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Ngt = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt−1 + uNgt (2.16)
Mt = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt−1 + uMt (2.17)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (2.18)
τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (2.19)
where, for X ∈ {A,φ,Ng,M, τ rn, τwl}, X denotes the steady state value of variable Xt, ρX
parameterizes the degree of persistency of a shock to X, uXt is an exogenously determined,
independently, identically, and Normally distributed innovation with zero mean and constant
variance σ2uX , and E[u
Y
t u
X
t ] = 0 for X 6= Y ∈ {A,φ,Ng,M, τ rn, τwl}. It is assumed that
|ρX |< 1 so that exogenous shocks are temporary.7
2.2 Equilibrium
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
With the investment technology having unlimited capacity, investors are assumed to liquidate
and borrow the maximum amount of equity that the liquidity constraints allow. Then the
budget constraint (2.3) becomes binding with equality,
nit+1 = (1− θ)it + (1− φt)δnt (2.20)
which, if re-structured, gives the entrepreneur’s investment for the period,
it =
(
1
1− θ
)
nit+1 −
(
1− φt
1− θ
)
δnt (2.21)
The investor’s budget constraint (2.5) is simplified by substituting Equation (2.21) to obtain
(see Appendix C.1)
cit + q
R
t n
i
t+1 = (1− τ rnt )rtnt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δnt + pt(mt −mit+1) (2.22)
where
qRt ≡
1− θqt
1− θ (2.23)
The RHS of Equation (2.22) is the investor’s net worth: his net dividends from equity holdings,
the value of depreciated equity (where a resaleable fraction, φt, is valued at the market price
and the non-resaleable fraction is valued at qRt ), and net sales of money. The LHS expresses
what he does with his net worth.
qRt is an effective payment the entrepreneur makes to himself, or his replacement cost, for
every unit of inside equity purchased. For an investment cost it, the investor raises as much as
θitqt from issuing new equity. This is the investment’s external finance. The remainder of the
investment cost, (it−θitqt), is internally financed from liquid funds, obtained from a combination
of liquidating outside equity and from money stocks. (it − θitqt) therefore represents the total
effective payment the investor makes to himself to purchase a fraction of his own new equity
7With an estimated DSGE model, Mertens and Ravn (2011a) show that responses are different in magnitude,
but not in direction, between temporary and permanent tax shocks.
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issue. Put differently, for every unit of investment, the entrepreneur retains (1−θ) units as inside
equity which require an effective payment of (1− θqt) to himself. Notice from Equation (2.23)
that the higher the market price of equity, the more funds he can raise, and the less he is
required to spend on accumulating inside equity, i.e. the smaller his effective payment, qRt ; and
conversely.
Alternatively, substituting Equation (2.20) into Equation (2.5) gives the investor’s resource
constraint (see Appendix C.1),
cit + (1− θqt)it = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + φtqtδnt + pt(mt −mit+1) (2.24)
The RHS of Equation (2.24) is the total liquid resources available to the investor in period
t: net dividends from equity, a resaleable portion of equity holdings, and net sales of money.
The LHS says how he uses these resources: for consumption and financing that portion of his
investment for which he cannot borrow.
At the start of period t the representative investor and saver make optimal choices on
{cit, it, nit+1,mit+1} and {cst , nst+1,mst+1}, respectively, conditional on all available information.
But their choices are made with uncertainty about investment opportunities in the future.
Entrepreneurs’ first order conditions yield an Euler equation (see Appendix C.2),
piEt
[
1
qt
([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)U ′e(cit+1)
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[
1
qt
([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1)U ′e(cst+1)
]
= Et
[
pt+1
pt
(
piU ′e(c
i
t+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)
)]
(2.25)
Once entrepreneurs identify their optimal paths, the Euler equation (2.25) describes their ex-
pectation that 1/qt additional units of equity and 1/pt additional units of money provide the
same marginal utility from consumption. The expression on the RHS of (2.25) is the expected
marginal benefit of holding 1/pt additional units of money. The expression on the LHS of (2.25)
is the expected marginal benefit of holding 1/qt additional units of equity. Each unit is expected
to return a net dividend of (1 − τ rnt+1)rt+1 plus a depreciated value. If there is an investment
opportunity, a resaleable fraction of depreciated equity, δφt+1, will be valued at the market
price, qt+1, while the non-resaleable fraction, δ(1−φt+1), will be valued at its replacement cost
qRt+1. If there is no investment opportunity, the depreciated value will be δqt+1.
Claim 1. qt 6= 1 ⇐⇒ mit+1 = 0
Proof of Claim 1. See Appendix C.4.
The market price of equity is critical for economic activity. An investor needs at least 1 unit
of general output for every unit of equity issued. If qt < 1 then the entrepreneur will not raise
enough funds in the market to fulfil his ambition of investing it. Investors will abandon their
opportunities, and then all entrepreneurs will become savers. If qt > 1 then an entrepreneur will
be able to materialize his opportunity to invest and sell as much equity as he can within budget
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and liquidity constraints. The following assumption is therefore made to restrict attention to
the case where investment takes place in the economy:
Assumption 1. qt > 1
By Claim 1 and Assumption 1, an investor will not have any money at the end of a period
of investment, i.e. mit+1 = 0. He exhausts all of his money in the pursuit of an investment
opportunity. In the next period, up to when new investment opportunities are revealed, the
current period’s investors will be able to replenish their money stocks.
The entrepreneur’s logarithmic utility function provides a standard feature that his con-
sumption in each period is a stable fraction, (1 − β), of his net worth in that period. From
Equations (2.6) and (2.22), Claim 1 and Assumption 1, a typical investor and saver therefore
consume, respectively,
cit = (1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtnt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δnt + ptmt) (2.26)
cst = (1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtnt + qtδnt + ptmt) (2.27)
The difference in consumption between the two types of entrepreneurs is given by
cst − cit = (qt − qRt )(1− φt)δnt
= (qt − 1)
(
1− φt
1− θ
)
δnt (2.28)
Assumption 1 therefore implies cst > c
i
t. Indeed, as entrepreneurs utilize equity and money
towards investment financing, they intertemporally substitute consumption away from an in-
vesting period and towards a saving period. During a period of saving they accumulate equity
and money, and do so in an optimal fashion according to the Euler equation (2.25).
Assumption 1 also implies (see Appendix C.5)
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqRt+1
qt
<
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
i.e. an investor’s equity portfolio generates a lower rate of return than a saver’s equity portfolio.
This is because of the limited resaleability of equity for an investor, which forces him to own
inside equity that is valued negatively to the market price of equity. Hence, the return on
equity is correlated with consumption. This correlation, along with the resaleability constraint,
is what makes equity risky. Money, on the other hand, is free from these risks. Its return does
not depend on having an investment opportunity, and it is perfectly liquid; hence two reasons
why entrepreneurs hold money. Saving entrepreneurs also accumulate money in preparation for
when they receive investment opportunities and expect to face financing constraints.
The Euler equation (2.25) simplifies to a portfolio balance equation (see Appendix C.3),
piEt

(
pt+1
pt
)
−
(
[1−τrnt+1]rt+1+φt+1δqt+1+[1−φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1nt+1 + [φt+1qt+1 + (1− φt+1)qRt+1]δnt+1 + pt+1mt+1

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= (1− pi)Et

(
[1−τrnt+1]rt+1+δqt+1
qt
)
−
(
pt+1
pt
)
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1nt+1 + qt+1δnt+1 + pt+1mt+1
 (2.29)
Equation (2.29) reflects the portfolio balance theory of Tobin (1958, 1969) and demonstrates
substitution between assets when their relative price changes. If qt rises, for example, then
equity’s expected return falls, and entrepreneurs substitute towards money. The substitution
itself creates an increase in demand for money, which, ceteris paribus, raises pt. Substitution
moves back and forth until expected portfolio returns between having and not having an invest-
ment opportunity are equal. The LHS of Equation (2.29) expresses an expected excess return
on money over equity if the entrepreneur becomes an investor. The RHS expresses an expected
excess return on equity over money if he becomes a saver. The portfolio balance equation says
that the ex ante identical entrepreneur equates the expected marginal benefits of receiving and
not receiving an investment opportunity. He does this by varying how many units of equity and
money he holds.
2.2.2 Workers
At the start of period t the representative worker chooses {cwt , lwt , nwt+1,mwt+1} to maximize his
expected discounted utility, subject to his budget constraint. The individual worker optimally
supplies labour until the marginal disutility of work (or equivalently, the marginal utility of
leisure) equals the real wage rate. First order conditions yield his supply of labour (see Appendix
C.6),
lwt =
[
(1− τwlt )wt
ω
] 1
ν
(2.30)
Claim 2. nwt+j = 0 and m
w
t+j = 0, for j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., i.e. the worker will always choose not to
hold equity and money.
Proof of Claim 2. From Equations (C.9), (C.11) and (C.12) in Appendix C.6, if the worker
decides to hold equity and money, i.e. if nwt+1 6= 0 and mwt+1 6= 0 then
δqt+1 + (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1
qt
=
pt+1
pt
=
1
β
(2.31)
Equation (2.31) says that holding equity and money will not provide any superior (expected)
gains above the discounted marginal utility from consumption, 1/β. If the worker has one more
unit of general output, he gains as much by consuming it as he expects to gain by saving it.
Then there is no reason for the worker to save. The worker saves only if there is a marginal
benefit from doing so.
By Claim 2, the worker’s budget constraint (2.9) simplifies to
cwt = (1− τwlt )wtlwt (2.32)
i.e. in each period the worker’s consumes his entire net wage earnings, thus making him non-
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Ricardian.8
2.2.3 The labour market
From the production function (2.1), the marginal product of labour is
∂yt
∂lt
= (1− γ)At
(
kt
lt
)γ
From Equation (2.2), the first order condition for gross profit maximization with respect to
labour is
∂yt
∂lt
− wt = 0
=⇒ (1− γ)At
(
kt
lt
)γ
− wt = 0
=⇒ lt = kt
[
(1− γ)At
wt
] 1
γ
which is the entrepreneur’s demand for labour, given his capital stock.
With an aggregate capital stock, Kt, owned entirely by entrepreneurs, it follows that the
aggregate demand for labour is
LDt = Kt
[
(1− γ)At
wt
] 1
γ
(2.33)
Given the homogeneity and unit mass of the worker population, from Equation (2.30), the
aggregate labour supply labour is
LSt =
[
(1− τwlt )wt
ω
] 1
ν
(2.34)
The inverse versions of these labour market functions (2.33) and (2.34) are, respectively,
wDt =
(1− γ)AtKγt
(Lt)
γ (2.35)
wSt =
[
ω
1− τwlt
]
(Lt)
ν (2.36)
Notice from Equation (2.35) that the slope of the inverse aggregate labour demand function
8The non-Ricardian feature is how this model departs from the standard Real Business Cycle model and starts
to resemble Kenyesian IS-LM. Driffill and Miller (2013) algebraically show that the KM model is fundamentally
IS-LM by simplifying it down to two equations that resemble IS and LM functions. If workers are Ricardian, as in
the standard RBC model, then a cut in the income tax rate increases the present value of disposable income, and
thus creates a positive wealth effect that induces a rise in saving and a drop in consumption. But here, a cut in
the income tax rate increases workers’ consumption; this will be seen in Section 3. The non-Ricardian feature of
this model arises endogenously. Elsewhere in the literature, where such behaviour is exogenously assumed to hold
(in Gal´ı et al. (2007), for example), it is justified by such things as lack of access to financial markets, myopia,
or fear of saving. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) provide empirical support for the existence of non-Ricardian
behaviour, while Mankiw (2000) reviews microeconomic evidence that supports such behaviour.
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depends negatively on capital elasticity of output, γ, and positively on productivity, At, and
the capital stock, Kt. The function’s curvature inversely depends on γ. Also, notice from
Equation (2.36) that supply’s slope varies positively with the relative utility weight, ω, and the
rate of tax on wages, τwlt , while its curvature varies positively with the inverse Frisch elasticity,
ν.
Given that wages are flexible, the labour market always clears and full employment is guaran-
teed. The market clears when LSt = L
D
t , which gives the equilibrium real wage and employment
(see Appendix C.7),
wt = K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
γ
γ+ν (1− τwlt )−
γ
γ+ν [(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν (2.37)
Lt = K
γ
γ+ν
t ω
− 1γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
1
γ+ν (2.38)
2.2.4 The equity market
Since every unit of equity produces a unit of capital, then the total stocks of equity and capital
are always equal, i.e.
Kt = Nt +N
g
t (2.39)
The law of motion for the aggregate capital stock is
Kt+1 = It + δKt (2.40)
Over the period, investors issue new equity amounting to θ of their investments, It, and sell φt
of their depreciated equity holdings, piδNt, to savers. And since investors do not hold money,
savers are the only participants in government OMOs. The stock of equity held by savers at
the end of the period is therefore
N st+1 = (1− pi)δNt + θIt + φtpiδNt − (Ngt+1 − δNgt ) (2.41)
Equation (2.41) can be re-expressed as an equity market clearing condition,
(N st+1 − δN st ) + (N st+1 − δN st ) = φtpiδNt + θIt (2.42)
The RHS of Equation (2.42) is the supply of equity, which originates from investors’ need for
finance: they liquidate a fraction, φt, of the stock they own, piNt, and they issue θIt new units.
The expression (N st+1 − δN st ) on the LHS represents private demand for equity, which comes
from savers. The government buys (Ngt+1 − δNgt ) units of equity (or sells, in which case this
expression enters negatively in Equation (2.42)).
2.2.5 Aggregate demand and supply
Aggregate private consumption is
Ct = C
i
t + C
s
t + C
w
t (2.43)
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where, from Equations (2.26), (2.27) and (2.29), consumption by investors, savers, and workers
are, respectively,
Cit = pi(1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtNt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δNt + ptMt) (2.44)
Cst = (1− pi)(1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtNt + qtδNt + ptMt) (2.45)
Cwt = (1− τwlt )wtLt (2.46)
As savers accumulate equity and money over the period, their aggregate asset portfolio at the
end of period t satisfies an aggregate portfolio balance equation,
piEt

(
pt+1
pt
)
−
(
[1−τrnt+1]rt+1+φt+1δqt+1+[1−φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1N st+1 + [φt+1qt+1 + (1− φt+1)qRt+1]δN st+1 + pt+1Mt+1

= (1− pi)Et

(
[1−τrnt+1]rt+1+δqt+1
qt
)
−
(
pt+1
pt
)
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1N st+1 + qt+1δN st+1 + pt+1Mt+1
 (2.47)
From Equation (2.24), total investment spending is
(1− θqt)It = ([1− τ rnt ]rt + φtδqt)piNt + piptMt − Cit (2.48)
From Equation (2.1), aggregate supply is
Yt = AtK
γ
t L
1−γ
t (2.49)
From Equation (2.2), aggregate gross profits are
rtKt = Yt − wtLt (2.50)
which gives gross rate of return to capital (see Appendix C.8),
rt = atK
α−1
t (2.51)
where
at ≡ γ
[
(1− γ)(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1−γ
ν+γ
A
1+ν
ν+γ
t (2.52)
α ≡ γ(1 + ν)
ν + γ
(2.53)
Finally, the goods market clears when
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (2.54)
In summary, the dynamic equilibrium of the model is characterized by equations (2.12),
(2.13), (2.37), (2.38), (2.39), (2.40), (2.42), (2.43), (2.44), (2.45), (2.46), (2.47), (2.48), (2.49),
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(2.50) and (2.54), the definition (2.23), and stochastic processes (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17),
(2.18) and (2.19).
2.3 Steady state
To introduce a balanced budget fiscal policy rule for government, the following assumption is
made about steady state.9
Assumption 2. In steady state, the government holds no equity, i.e. Ng = 0.
For any equity the government buys or sells, the exchange is made with money. If the
government does not hold equity in steady state then the money supply does not change. This
implies the government earns no dividends or seignorage revenue, and must therefore balance
its fiscal budget to satisfy Equation (2.13). Assumption 2 together with exogeneity of money
supply (by Equation (2.17)) imply that the government holds no equity in every period, and its
budget constraint (2.13) becomes Gt = Tt for all t.
3 Impulse response analysis
This section presents the results of simulating unexpected, exogenous, temporary cuts to both
tax rates (a “tax shock”). The cuts to wage and dividend income tax rates are equivalent to 1%
and 2.8% of national output, respectively. Tax collections fall by 3.3% ceteris paribus, and by
3.1% with endogenous changes in tax bases. From the next period, the tax shock deteriorates
at an assumed rate of 5% per quarter, and both tax rates asymptotically increase towards their
steady state levels. The main results of this section are that the shock increase output, private
consumption, and investment; the increases in output and consumption are significant and
long-lasting; and the liquidity constraints play a major role in the shock’s long-term persistence.
The shock is simulated by the quantitative technique of calibration. Appendix A describes
the calibration process in detail. Structural parameters are set to the “baseline” values in Table 4
(in Appendix A); these values are taken from similar models in the related literature. Steady
state levels and autoregressive (shock) parameters for exogenous variables are set according to
values listed in Table 5 (in Appendix A). All parameter values are based on quarterly data.
Results are presented as impulse responses, which are graphically illustrated Figure 1 and
summarized in Table 1.
3.1 Immediate responses
Labour market. In response to the cut in the rate of tax on wage income, workers increase
their labour supply at each and every wage (from Equation (2.34)).10 In reply, entrepreneurs
9With Assumption 2 the implied steady state system is simple enough to algebraically solve by hand; this
solution is given in Appendix D. Without Assumption 2 the implied steady state system is too complex to
algebraically solve by hand; nevertheless, a numerical simulation reveals that in this steady state the government
holds an insignificantly small quantity of equity. With or without Assumption 2, the steady state system offers
two positive roots for q. One root is greater than 1, i.e. high enough to guarantee investment, and is therefore
accepted as equity’s steady state price.
10More precisely, the baseline setting for ν implies that the inverse aggregate labour supply function (2.36) is
linear through the origin, as illustrated in Figure 12. The shock therefore pivots the supply curve outwards.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of a temporary, negative tax shock: baseline scenario
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NOTES: Vertical axes measure percentage deviation from steady state. Horizontal axes measure quarters after
the shock, starting from quarter 1. The blue dot indicates the quarter 1 response. Impulse responses for {Kt, Nst }
occur at the end of the quarter.
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Table 1: Impulse responses of a tax shock: baseline scenario
Impulse responses (%) Quarters to
Quarter: 1 2 4 8 20 200 Largest Largest 10% of Qu. 1
Tt −3.1 −2.9 −2.6 −2 −0.9 0.1 −3.1 1 30
Yt 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 0.2 1.8 27 200
It 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.9 0 1.9 1 93
Ct 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.7 0.2 2.3 1 168
Cwt 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 0.1 1.7 1 172
Cit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 200
Cst 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0 0.6 1 155
N st 0.3 2.1 5.3 10.4 19.2 3.4 22.2 36 200
wt −0.9 −0.8 −0.6 −0.2 0.5 0.2 0.9 45 200
Lt 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0 0.4 1 172
rt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 200
Kt 1.9 3.6 6.8 12 20.8 3.6 23.6 35 200
pt 6.6 6.3 5.7 4.7 2.6 0 6.6 1 48
qt 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.2 1 0 3.2 1 35
NOTES: This table gives impulse responses at certain periods after the shock, and the period of time its takes
for impulse responses to reach their peak and to get within 10% of their quarter 1 magnitudes. Convergence
of 200 quarters means some time after 200 quarters, and not in the 200th quarter. Impulse responses for stock
variables {Kt, Nst } occur at the end of the quarter.
expand their labour demand by accepting a lower wage, and thereby offset marginal labour
productivity losses (from Equation (2.33)). With assumptions of flexible wages and full em-
ployment, the labour market therefore adjusts to a lower real wage (by Equation (2.37)) and
higher employment (by Equation (2.38)).
Output. Output increases because of more employment (from Equation (2.49)). The other
determinants of output are unchanged by the shock. Total factor productivity is exogenously
determined (by Equation (2.14)), and the period’s capital stock is determined before the shock
hits.
Entrepreneurs. The cut in the dividend income tax improves the net worth of all en-
trepreneurs. As a result, these agents all increase their consumption (by Equation (2.44) and
Equation (2.45)). Those who receive investment opportunities early in the quarter spend more
on investment (from Equation (2.48)), while savers increase their demand for both assets.
Money market. Figure 2B illustrates the immediate effects of the shock on the money mar-
ket. Demand comes from entrepreneurs and supply is fully controlled by the government. DM0
and SM0 are the initial (i.e. steady state) demand and supply curves, respectively. Savers in-
crease their demand for money after net worth improvements; this is illustrated by a rightward
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Figure 2: Asset markets and immediate effects of the tax shock
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NOTES: D denotes demand and S denotes supply. Superscripts N andM denote equity and money, respectively.
Subscripts 0 and 1 denote steady state and quarter 1, respectively.
shift of DM0 to D
M
1 . With exogenously fixed money supply, the result is a higher price.
Equity market. Figure 2A illustrates immediate effects of the shock on the equity market.
DN0 and S
N
0 are the initial (steady state) demand and supply curves, respectively. Demand
comes from savers and the government; supply comes from investors. Savers increase their
demand for equity following net worth improvements; this is illustrated by a rightward shift of
DN0 to D
N
1 . Equity’s supply increases as investors issue new issues to finance their investment;
this is represented by a rightward shift of SN0 to S
N
1 . The increase in supply is small; because
of the borrowing constraint, investors issue a small amount of equity relative to the additional
investment cost. As a consequence, equity’s market price increases.
Internal amplification. A demand for money exists because of both liquidity constraints;
the borrowing constraint, in particular, restricts the shock-induced increase in equity supply to
be small, and is therefore responsible for the asset’s higher price. Increases in both asset prices
amplify the net worth improvements of entrepreneurs, which in turn increases asset demand and
investment. This “internal amplification” mechanism originates from the liquidity constraints
and is the cause of the long-term persistence of the shock.
Consider a counterfactual scenario. If the borrowing constraint is calibrated sufficiently
loose then the shock encourages investors to issue a considerable amount of new equity, and
(as if SN1 is further to the right than drawn in Figure 2A) the shock then reduces the price
of the asset. This result implies a higher expected return on equity, which encourages agents
to substitute away from money. Depending on the relative sizes of this portfolio balance effect
and the positive wealth effect, money’s price either increases by a smaller degree than in the
baseline calibration or decreases altogether. If the latter result holds, i.e. both asset prices
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fall, then the ceteris paribus effects on entrepreneurs from the cut in the dividend tax rate
are (partially or completely) offset. In particular, a first quarter increase in investment is not
achieved. Without an increase in investment, aggregate demand decreases. And, as explained in
Section 3.2, investment is key to the internal propagation of the shock, particularly for output.
Private consumption. Aggregate private consumption’s largest contributor comes from
workers. The fall in the real wage is larger than the rise in employment (see Table 1), and
therefore the aggregate gross wage decreases. But because of the drop in the tax rate, workers
enjoy a higher aggregate net wage and, being non-Ricardian, consume more general output.
Savers and investors consume more because of improvements in the net worth. Accordingly,
total consumption increases.
Government. The cuts to wage and dividend income tax rates are equivalent to 1% and
2.8% of national output, respectively. Tax collections fall by 3.3% ceteris paribus.11 With
more output and a smaller aggregate gross wage bill, the aggregate gross dividends to capital
are higher (from Equation (2.50)). These endogenous changes in tax bases together with the
tax rate cuts cause tax collections to fall by 3.1% (from Equation (2.12)). The government
holds no stocks of money and equity, and is therefore unaffected by asset price changes. The
fiscal budget is balanced by matching the decrease in taxation with a reduction in government
spending. However, the strong increase in investment together with the increase in private
consumption outweigh the decrease in government spending.
3.2 Path to adjustment
The speed of convergence is indicated by the time a variable takes to get “close” to steady state.
A variable is considered “close” to steady state if the percentage deviation is within 10% of the
immediate shock response. The last column of Table 1 gives this indicator convergence. Table 1
also gives the largest impulse response by magnitude and the quarter in which this occurs.
The model’s calibration assumes that, from the second quarter, the shock deteriorates at
an assumed rate of 5% per quarter, and both tax rates asymptotically increase towards their
steady state levels. As the effects of the shock ware off, asset prices and private consumption
converge steadily towards steady state.
The steady state level of investment creates a quantity of new capital that exactly replaces
depreciated units. Since the shock increases investment above its steady state level, the capital
stock increases by the end of the first quarter. In the second quarter, as tax rates start increasing
towards pre-shock levels, workers reduce their labour supply; in the labour market, this produces
an increase in the real wage and a decrease in employment. Long-term economic growth is thus
achieved by increases in the capital stock. This is why investment is described as the “internal
propagation” mechanism.
Furthermore, with more output and a lower aggregate wage bill, gross aggregate dividends
are higher. This in part helps entrepreneurs enjoy higher-than-normal net worth. Investment is
therefore sustained above steady state, and the capital stock continues to increase. The stock
11This is measured by a specially-constructed variable T ∗t , which is described in Section 4.
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peaks after almost 9 years at 23.6% above steady state. By then, the level of depreciation starts
to exceed investment, and the capital stock starts to return to its pre-shock level. This is why
capital exhibits a hump-shaped trajectory.
Employment persistently declines since its initial response to the shock. Workers continue
with their supply reduction in response to the increase in the rate of tax. The real wage increases,
and even overshoots its steady state level in the 10th quarter. It peaks just after 11 years at
0.9% above steady state (after falling below by 0.9% in the first quarter). The eventual decline
in the wage rate occurs when entrepreneurs reduce their labour demand when the capital stock
starts decreasing.
Output remains heavily influenced by capital, and even traces the same hump-shaped tra-
jectory. Over its adjustment path, output is kept elevated above its steady state level while it
converges. It increases continuously for almost 7 years before returning towards its pre-shock
level. But the return is slow, and even after 200 quarters it is still approximately 0.2% above
steady state, after being 1.8% above at its peak.
4 Tax multipliers
The objective of this section is to describe the shock responses in Section 3 as either “large” or
“small”. To do this, responses are quantified by tax multipliers. A variable’s response is then
described as “large” if the absolute value of its tax multiplier is in excess of unity; otherwise
the response is “small”. Multipliers are more suitable than impulse responses for describing
the magnitude of the effects of the shock, for two reasons. Firstly, the shock is not normalized,
because of its duality, and impulse responses are therefore difficult to interpret on their own.
Multipliers, on the other hand, measure normalized responses. Secondly, these multipliers are
constructed to measure the fall in tax collections due to cuts in both tax rates, ceteris paribus.
They therefore disentangle the discretionary change in taxes (i.e. the change in tax rates) from
the endogenous component (i.e. the changes in tax bases, wtLt and rtKt).
12 Multipliers are
computed according to the methodology outlined below, and results are given in Table 2. This
section omits any further multiplier analysis of the tax shock, because it would say the same
things as the impulse responses analysis in Section 3.
4.1 Methodology
Tax multipliers are obtained for real aggregate variables only. Impact and cumulative multipliers
are calculated. Changes in both tax rates are captured by a single variable, T ∗t , which represents
government tax collections with tax bases held constant to their steady state levels, i.e. from
Equation (2.12),
T ∗t = τ
rn
t rN + τ
wl
t wL (4.1)
where notation without time subscripts represent steady state (i.e. t = 0) values. Changes in
T ∗t therefore represent ceteris paribus changes in taxes. The deviation of taxes in period t from
12Perotti (2012) highlights the importance of separating discretionary from endogenous changes in taxes by
showing they have different effects on output.
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steady state with tax bases held constant is
T ∗t − T = (τ rnt − τ rn)rN + (τwlt − τwl)wL (4.2)
If the immediate post-shock tax rates are τ rn1 and τ
wl
1 then the immediate change in T
∗
t is
T ∗1 − T = (τ rn1 − τ rn)rN + (τwl1 − τwl)wL (4.3)
Tax multipliers therefore measure the response of a variable, over a given period of time, to a
drop in government tax receipts by 1 unit of general output due to discretionary cuts in both
tax rates, ceteris paribus.
Impact multipliers measure the response of a real aggregate variable in period t to the change
in T ∗t in period 1,
Xt −X
T ∗1 − T
(4.4)
Of special interest in this class of multipliers is the period 1 response of the variable, or the
immediate impact multiplier,
X1 −X
T ∗1 − T
(4.5)
Cumulative multipliers measure the variable’s response over a period of time. They capture
accumulated changes in the variable as well as accumulated changes in the policy variable.
Cumulative tax multipliers are measured over 0.5, 1, 2, 3, and 4 year horizons according to∑n
t=1 (Xt −X)∑n
t=1 (T
∗
t − T )
(4.6)
4.2 Results: multiplier responses
Multipliers measure the change in a real variable, i.e. in terms of units of output, for every
unit of general output that the government gives up in tax revenue in the first quarter, due to
discretionary cuts in both tax rates ceteris paribus. A negative (positive, respectively) multiplier
indicates that the variable increases (decreases, respectively) after the shock. If cumulative
multipliers of a variable increase (decrease, respectively) with the measured time horizon, then
the variable is converging slower (faster, respectively) than T ∗t towards steady state.
Output and private consumption have very large, negative responses to the shock, both
contemporaneously and cumulatively. On impact, output and consumption increase by 2.9
and 3.5 units of general output, respectively, for every unit the government gives up from tax
cuts, ceteris paribus. Both their cumulative multipliers increase with the time horizon. This
suggests that while the shock itself wares off, its effects on output and consumption continue
to propagate. It also confirms the slow convergence that is suggested graphically by Figure 1.
Investment has a moderate increase. A unitary multiplier is observed on impact of the shock,
and as the shock wares off, investment converges at a uniformly proportional and slightly slower
rate than T ∗t .
By far, the largest responses are by asset prices. They both increase substantially, with
impact multipliers of –11.8 for money and –5.3 for equity, and with similar values cumulatively
22
Table 2: Multipliers of a tax shock: baseline scenario
Immediate
impact
Cumulative
6-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year
Yt −2.9 −3.1 −3.4 −4.2 −4.9 −5.7
It −1.0 −1.1 −1.1 −1.1 −1.1 −1.1
Ct −3.5 −3.6 −3.7 −4.0 −4.2 −4.5
Cwt −2.1 −2.1 −2.2 −2.3 −2.5 −2.7
Cit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cst −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.2
wt 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.1 1.5 0.9
rt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pt −11.8 −11.8 −11.8 −11.9 −11.9 −11.9
qt −5.3 −5.2 −5.2 −5.2 −5.1 −5.0
NOTES: This table shows the multiplier responses to exogenous cuts in tax rates, ceteris paribus. Responses are
measured relative to the drop in overall tax collections while holding tax bases constant. For every 1 unit less of
general output the government collects in tax revenue in the first quarter, multipliers measure the consequential
changes in endogenous variables. A negative multiplier indicates that the variable increases after the drop in
taxes.
over the various measurement horizons. Both contemporaneously and cumulatively, savers’
consumption has a small increase (with multipliers of –0.2), and investors’ consumption and
the rate of return on capital have insignificant responses (with multipliers near 0).
5 Sensitivity analysis
The robustness of results is examined with respect to the calibration of structural parameters
and the persistence of tax shocks. For brevity, the details and results of these exercises are
provided in Appendix B. The overall conclusion is that results are qualitatively robust, but
quantitatively sensitive, to assumptions regarding structural parameter values, and qualitatively
and quantitatively sensitive to significant variations in the persistence of tax shocks.
5.1 Sensitivity to structural parameters.
Structural parameter sensitivity analysis is performed systematically by three local methods,
all involving repeated simulations of the shock with combinations of sensitivity settings that
are listed in Table 4. The first method uses one change in one parameter at a time; the second
and third methods use combinations of two or more sensitivity parameter values. Results are
quantitatively sensitive to one-at-a-time variation of three structural parameters: the subjective
discount factor (β), capital’s share in output (γ), and the survival rate of capital after depreci-
ation (δ). The model is also sensitive to combinations of alternative parameter settings, more
so when these settings go beyond those of β, γ, and δ. Nevertheless, from changing parameter
values either one-at-a-time or in combinations, tax shock responses vary only in magnitude, and
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not in direction or adjustment trajectories. Finally, comparing baseline responses to alternatives
from all possible combinations of parameter values shows that, with the exception of investors’
consumption, Cit , baseline responses are not extreme.
5.2 Sensitivity to the persistence of tax shocks.
Sensitivity to the persistence of tax shocks, ρτwl and ρτrn, is examined by repeatedly simulating
the shock with simultaneous use of values above and below the calibrated (and fairly standard)
setting. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively sensitive to the calibration of the persistence
parameters for tax shocks, ρτrn and ρτwl. Very small changes in the persistence parameters do
very little to alter responses; but with larger parameter variations there are significant changes
in trajectory and convergence. Lowering the level of persistence reveals that investment, savers’
equity, capital, investors’ consumption, and output are still slow to converge to steady state.
This suggests that features in the model – in particular, the liquidity constraints – are responsible
for their long-term responses the shock. The mechanism, called the “internal amplification”
mechanism, is described in the analysis of the shock.
6 Discussion
6.1 Comparison of results
This paper is closely related to Mountford and Uhlig (2009) (henceforth MU), who show that
an unexpected, exogenous increase in government spending that is completely financed by an
increase in taxation causes reductions in private consumption and investment on impact, as
well as in output from the second period.13 The converse of this result suggests a recipe for
debt-free economic expansion. This paper complements MU by showing that the converse of
their result is also true. The novelty of this paper is that while MU obtain their results from
an empirical study with vector autoregressions, this paper is a theoretical investigation using a
mostly neoclassical DSGE model.
Eggertsson (2010) also propose a balanced budget stimulus with tax rate cuts. He uses
a New Keynesian model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition, and compares the
effects of cutting different tax rates. His recipe, therefore, is to cut consumption taxes and raise
wage income and wealth taxes. However, he also suggests that liquidity constraints may reverse
the intended responses. Conclusions between this paper and Eggertsson (2010) are different
because this paper does not feature consumption taxes or New Keynesian frictions.
Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011a,b, 2012), and Monacelli et al. (2012)
estimate vector autoregressions using, as the basis of datasets, the narrative record of exogenous
US fiscal shocks developed by Romer and Romer (2010). These papers explore and quantify
the macroeconomic effects of changes in taxation. Their peak cumulative multipliers are given
in Table 3.14 Despite the differences in methodology, these papers arrive at the same conclusion
as this paper, i.e. they support fiscal expansion by tax reductions. Estimated multipliers for
output, consumption, and investment are large and negative, and responses exhibit long-term
13There is, however, a small increase in output on impact, with a multiplier of 1.3.
14In the case of Mertens and Ravn (2011a), Table 3 gives multipliers from unexpected tax shocks.
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Table 3: Multipliers: a survey
Output Consumption Investment Employment
Romer and Romer (2010) –2.9
(10 quarters)
Mertens and Ravn (2011a) –2.0 –2.0 –10.0 –1.0
(10 quarters) (10 quarters) (10 quarters) (10 quarters)
Mertens and Ravn (2012) –1.8
(3 quarters)
Monacelli et al. (2012) –2.7 –9.7 –0.5
(1 year) (1 year) (2 quarters)
NOTES: This table gives the peak cumulative multipliers from a 1% cut in taxation, and (in brackets) the time
after the shock these multipliers are observed. A negative multiplier therefore represents an increase in the
variable.
persistence. However, their results suggest weaker output and consumption responses and a
much stronger investment response than the ones found here.
6.2 Relationship with the KM-related literature
The 2007/8 financial turmoil brought a wave of recent attention to Kiyotaki and Moore (2012),
for two reasons. First, commentators argue that the cause of the crisis was the sudden and unex-
pected deterioration in the value of partially liquid private financial assets (Brunnermeier (2009),
Del Negro et al. (2011), Bigio (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). Assets’ resaleability
and collateral suitability were thus adversely affected. This event bears a striking resemblance
to KM’s negative liquidity shock. Secondly, the government holding risky, privately-issued as-
sets with limited resaleability was the central component of the unconventional policy responses
to the crisis, whereby these assets were exchanged for safe, liquid, government-issued securities
and cash.15 This is, in fact, KM’s main policy implication, that government can inject liquidity
to counter-cyclically dampen business cycle fluctuations.
The KM model is theoretically adjusted and/or extended in a series of recent papers. These
papers can be classified into two groups. The first group uses the KM model to evaluate the
unconventional policies seen in the crisis; Del Negro et al. (2011) and Driffill and Miller (2013)
are members of this research, and both show that recessions would have been exacerbated had
it not been for government interventions. The second KM-related group returns to the original
questions posed by KM on the importance of (i) liquidity shocks for explaining business cycles,
and (ii) liquidity constraints for the propagation of productivity shocks. Papers in this group
include Salas-Landeau (2010), Bigio (2010, 2012), Ajello (2011), Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), Shi
(2012), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
The inclusion of distortionary taxes and a balanced budget rule is not unique in KM-related
literature. Ajello (2011), Shi (2012), and Driffill and Miller (2013) have a balanced budget
15The various facilities through which the US government implemented these exchanges are described in Ar-
mantier et al. (2008), Fleming et al. (2009), Adrian et al. (2009), and Adrian et al. (2011).
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rule for government. Ajello (2011) also includes distortionary taxes, but he modifies the KM
model more extensively than in this paper. The uniqueness of this contribution is that it is the
first to examine fiscal shocks in the KM model. What is shares with these papers, the second
KM-related group in particular, is showing the macroeconomic significance of KM’s liquidity
constraints in propagating exogenous shocks. In this case, however, the shocks are to tax rates.
6.3 The significance to New Keynesian frictions
One significance of this paper is that it shows how a neoclassical model can be modified to
produce large responses to fiscal shocks. The New Keynesian model is the workhorse for fiscal
policy research. This perhaps follows from papers like Burnside et al. (2004), which shows that
the magnitude of observed responses to fiscal shocks are not matched by a standard neoclassical
models, but they are matched by models that include habit formation and adjustment costs.
Beyond the liquidity constraints, this model is otherwise neoclassical. This paper therefore
shows that a host of New Keynesian frictions are not always needed to study fiscal policy. The
KM model can be a workhorse for that purpose.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that cuts to income tax rates in a liquidity constrained economy increases
output, investment, and private consumption. The model is a modification of the mostly neo-
classical, DSGE model of liquidity and business cycles by Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). In
particular, distortionary taxes and a balanced budget fiscal rule are added to KM. The model is
calibrated to be consistent with the KM-related literature. Results are qualitatively robust, but
quantitatively sensitive, to assumptions regarding structural parameter values, and qualitatively
and quantitatively sensitive to significant variations in the persistence of tax shocks.
This paper is unique in three ways. Firstly, these results are consistent with those obtained
by Mountford and Uhlig (2009); but while they use an estimated VAR, this paper complements
and supports with a theoretical finding from a calibrated neoclassical model. Secondly, this
paper distinguishes itself from the rest of the KM-related literature by being the first to apply
the KMmodel to fiscal shocks; this related literature remains focused on showing the significance
of liquidity shocks in explaining business cycles, and the importance of liquidity constraints for
propagating productivity shocks. Thirdly, the paper shows how a neoclassical model can be
modified to produce large responses to fiscal shocks.
Some opportunities for future research are suggested by this work. One extension is an
examination of a cut in taxes without a balanced budget in this environment. Another useful
experiment is to cut one tax rate at a time, and determine their relative merits in the economic
expansion seen in this paper. It would be interesting to determine the effects of an increase
in government spending, with and without a balanced budget. The model can be adjusted by
adding New Keynesian type frictions, and then determine whether such frictions change the
results. Finally, taking this study to the data will facilitate the calculation of multipliers that
are reliable for quantitatively comparing results with the related literature.
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Technical Appendix
Appendix A Model calibration
This appendix describes the choice of parameter values with which the tax shock is simulated
by the quantitative technique of calibration. All parameter values are based on quarterly data,
mostly on the US economy; parameters concerning tax rates are obtained from UK data. Struc-
tural parameter values are taken from the KM-related literature; these values are summarized
in Table 4. The “baseline setting” is used in Section 3 to obtain the main results of the tax
shock, and the “sensitivity settings” are used in Appendix B to re-simulate the tax shock and
assess the sensitivity of results to the model’s calibration. Steady state levels and autoregres-
sive (shock) parameters of exogenous variables are computed; these values are summarized in
Table 5; Appendix E provides the data used in those exercises.
A.1 Structural parameters
Table 4: Structural parameters: baseline and sensitivity settings
Structural parameters Symbol
Baseline
setting
Sensitivity settings
Lower Higher
Fraction of investment financed by equity θ 0.185 0.1665 0.2035
Subjective discount factor β 0.99 0.98 0.999
Capital’s share in output γ 0.4 0.36 n.a.
Survival rate of capital after depreciation δ 0.975 n.a. 0.98
Probability of investment opportunity pi 0.05 0.037 0.069
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply ν 1 0.5 2
Relative utility weight on labour ω 4.01 3.409 8.15
NOTES: Appendix A describes how these values are derived. The “baseline setting” is used in this section to
obtain the main results of the tax shock. The “sensitivity settings” are used in Appendix B to re-simulate the tax
shock and assess the sensitivity of results to the model’s calibration. All parameter values are based on quarterly
data.
A.1.1 Liquidity constraint parameters, θ and φt
One challenging aspect of the calibration exercise is finding suitable values for θ and φt. These
parameters are not directly observable, and are instead fixed to empirical proxies. Other mem-
bers of the KM-related literature handle this problem in different ways. One consistent theme
in these papers has been a simplification that follows from earlier versions of KM: θ and φt
are assumed to be equal in steady state, while outside of steady state φt varies stochastically.
The calibration task then comes down to finding an empirical estimate of either parameter.
Del Negro et al. (2011) targets φt. They propose that φt is a linear function of the steady state
value of a “liquidity share” variable, a ratio of liquid assets (empirically, US government liabil-
ities) to total assets (empirically, net claims of private assets). From US data over the period
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1952:1 – 2008:4, the authors obtain an average liquidity share of 12.64%. Then according to
the hypothesized linear relationship, they found that a value of 0.185 for φt was related to a
liquidity share of 13%. KM and Driffill and Miller (2013) also calibrate with this value of φ,
and this paper does the same.
Sensitivity analysis uses higher and lower settings of 0.2035 and 0.1665, respectively, which
represent relaxation and tightening of liquidity constraints by 10% relative to baseline. The
higher setting is the highest (common) value for θ and φ that allows the model to converge to
a stable, unique equilibrium.16
A.1.2 Subjective discount factor, β
Frederick et al. (2002) provide an extensive review of the literature on empirical and experimen-
tal studies of β and observe that most arrive at values close to 1, or equivalently, quarterly rates
of time preference close to zero, which implies that agents have almost equal preferences for the
present and future. More recently, Theodoridis et al. (2012) estimate a VAR based on the Smets
and Wouters (2007) DSGE model, but with time-varying parameters, and find that β is close
to, but less than 1, and does not vary over time. These results support the standard practice in
the DSGE literature to fix β very close to 1. The most popular setting is a quarterly discount
factor of 0.99, which means a 1% quarterly rate of time preference. This value is selected here.
Amongst the KM-related literature, Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012) shares this setting.
Values above and below, but not far away from, the baseline setting for β are chosen for
sensitivity analysis. A higher β of 0.999 equates agents’ preferences for the present and future.
This setting appears in, for example, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), who also investigate fiscal
shocks in a calibrated DSGE model with financial frictions. A lower β of 0.98 implies agents are
more impatient and prefer the present, and therefore discount future utility by a 2% quarterly
rate of time preference.
A.1.3 Capital’s share in output, γ
Christensen et al. (1980) estimate an average value of 0.40 for γ in the US between 1947 and
1973. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) obtain a measure over an updated period 1948 – 2005,
and not only confirm that this value still holds, but support the Kaldor (1961) fact that it
remains constant over time.
Sensitivity from γ relies exclusively on a lower value of 0.36. This setting appears in Shi
(2012), Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Lower values of 0.33 and
0.22 are used by Bigio (2012) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), respectively. Values above the
baseline setting are uncommon in the literature, and are therefore omitted in the analysis.
16Some members of the KM-related literature successfully calibrate with higher settings in their own unique
models: Shi (2012) set φ = 0.273 and Bigio (2012) set θ = 0.4. Shi (2012) associates φt with the return on liquid
assets; he uses the range that Del Negro et al. (2011) find for annual net returns on US government liabilities, i.e.
1.72% for 1-year maturities to 2.57% for 10-year maturities, and sets an intermediate return of 2% as the target
to which φt is calibrated. Bigio (2012) follows Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007) and sets θ to match the aggregate
moments of coefficients in a regression by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) of the “great ratio” I/K against the
return on capital and Tobin’s q. Salas-Landeau (2010) warns against using high parameter values, after finding
that the constraints need to be tight for shocks to have significant effects.
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A.1.4 Survival rate of capital after depreciation, δ
A quarterly depreciation rate of 2.5%, or equivalently, an annual rate of 1− (1−0.025)4 ≈ 10%,
is standard in RBC studies on the US economy. Since King et al. (1988), who describe 10%
as a “more realistic depreciation rate” (p. 218), this value has been widely used in DSGE
calibrations. δ is therefore set to 0.975.
Like, γ, sensitivity analysis with δ relies on just one alternative setting, a higher value of
0.98. Rates above the baseline are not unusual in the literature. Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), Shi
(2012), and Bigio (2012), for example, use 0.9774, 0.981, and 0.9873, respectively, and at the
extreme end, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) uses 0.99.
A.1.5 Probability of an investment opportunity, pi
pi can be related empirically to the fraction of firms that significantly adjust their capital in a
given period. From samples of US manufacturing firms, Doms and Dunne (1998) estimate this
fraction at 20% in any given year, from which Del Negro et al. (2011) and KM set pi at the
quarterly rate of 1− (1− 0.2)0.25 ≈ 5%. This value is chosen for calibrating the parameter.
Cooper et al. (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) perform empirical studies similar to
Doms and Dunne (1998) and estimate that 14% to 25% of firms significantly adjust their capital
in any given year. The difference in estimates between the two sets of studies are down to what
the authors consider to be a “significant adjustment” in capital stock. To Doms and Dunne
(1998), a “significant adjustment” means an event where more than 10% of a firm’s capital is
repaired or replaced, whereas Cooper et al. (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) define it
as more than 20%.17 The interval estimate for the fraction of firms that invest in a year provide
upper and lower alternative settings for pi. If 14% of firms are assumed to significantly replace
or repair their capital in a year then the implied value of pi is 1− (1− 0.14)0.25 ≈ 3.7%. If 25%
of firms invest then pi = 1− (1− 0.25)0.25 ≈ 6.9%.
A.1.6 Frisch elasticity of labour supply, 1/ν
The value of 1/ν in applied economics is the subject of unresolved debate. On the one hand,
empirical microeconomic studies usually find small estimates, i.e. values below 1; a review of
the literature by Contreras and Sinclair (2008) shows this. Early work by MaCurdy (1981) and
Altonji (1986) find estimates within US data ranging from 0 to 0.5. Since then, most empirical
studies, at least those whose samples are selected from males, fall within this range; for example,
in Pencavel (1986) and Domeij and Flode´n (2006). On the other hand, macroeconomics needs
much larger elasticities for calibrating models to match observed business cycle fluctuations in
aggregate variables, as Prescott (2006) insists. For example, Peterman (2012) explains that
values between 2 and 4 are required to replicate empirical volatility in aggregate labour hours.
The wide micro-macro disparity on the value of 1/ν is mainly due to sample selection:
macroeconomic studies aggregate all individuals, whereas microeconomic studies rely on nar-
rower samples (Peterman (2012) and Chetty et al. (2012)). The results of MaCurdy (1981),
17Alternatively, Gourio and Kashyap (2007) consider a “significant adjustment” as investment which amounts
to 35% or more of beginning-of-period capital.
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for instance, are drawn from prime-aged males. The DSGE literature is fairly consistent in
using elastic values. However, there is a subset that applies unitary elasticity in macroeconomic
models. This is done by Christiano et al. (2005), following elasticity estimates in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999), and also by Christiano et al. (2013) and Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-
Corugedo (2013) in their DSGE models with financial frictions. KM, Del Negro et al. (2011),
and Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012) also calibrate with Frisch elasticity, and this paper does the
same.
Sensitivity from 1/ν is assessed from both elastic and inelastic settings. A higher value of 2 is
used, following the recommendations of macroeconomists; this value is also used in calibrations
by Shi (2012) and Bigio (2012). The upper bound of 0.5 from MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji
(1986) is used as the lower sensitivity setting.
A.1.7 Relative utility weight on labour, ω
ω is often calibrated with consideration of ν, since together they form labour’s coefficient in
the worker’s utility function. As Hall (1997) points out, researchers have different ways of
representing this coefficient.18 ω is usually calibrated to match an average or steady state
fraction of time spent in work. According to Villa and Yang (2011), the common assumption
in the literature is that individuals spend 8 hours a day in work, or one third of their time.
Villa and Yang (2011) assume a utility function similar to the one in this paper, and they set
ω = 4.01; the difference between this model and theirs is that they include habit persistence in
consumption. Nevertheless, given the modelling similarities, their setting is followed here.
Villa and Yang (2011) is based on Gertler and Karadi (2011), who calibrate ω to 3.409 based
on estimates by Primiceri et al. (2006). This value is taken as a lower sensitivity setting for
ω. For a higher sensitivity setting, the value of 8.15 that is set by Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012)
is used. This paper shares modelling similarities with Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), including
the same utility specification for workers. Their calibration of ω is done to match moments in
steady state with those found empirically.
A.2 Parameterization of exogenous variables
A.2.1 Autoregressive (shock) parameters, ρX and σuX
Persistence parameters are calibrated to values less than one so that exogenous shocks are not
permanent. ρφ, ρNg, ρτrn, and ρτwl are all set to a standard value of 0.95; the settings of ρA and
ρM are explained below. In Appendix B the tax shock is re-simulated with different parameter
settings to determine the sensitivity of results to the calibration of these parameters.
It can easily be shown that the standard deviation σX of exogenous variable Xt implies the
standard deviation of innovations to Xt,
σuX =
√
(1− ρ2X)σ2X (A.1)
where X is the steady state value of Xt. For brevity, the derivation of this result is relegated
18Hall (1997), for instance, normalizes ω and applies a relative weight to consumption.
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Table 5: Exogenous variables: steady state levels and autoregressive (shock) parameters
Variable
Steady state
level
Persistence
parameter
Standard deviation
of innovations
Symbol Value Symbol Value Symbol Value
Aggregate productivity A 1 ρA 0.979 σuA 0.00147
Resaleable fraction of equity φ θ ρφ 0.95 σuφ 0.00042
Government equity Ng 0 ρNg 0.95 σuM 0.1771
Money supply M 1.95 ρM 0.952 σuNg 0.00421
Rate of tax on dividends τ rn 0.207 ρτrn 0.95 σuτrn 0.00349
Rate of tax on wages τwl 0.231 ρτwl 0.95 σuτwl 0.00124
NOTES: Appendix A describes how these values are derived. Exogenous variables {At, φt, Ngt ,Mt, τrnt , τwlt }
follow stochastic AR(1) processes (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19) which have the general form
Xt = (1− ρX)X + ρXXt−1 + uXt where ρX is the persistence parameter and uXt are innovations.
to Appendix C.10.
In an unconventional policy move, the US government started purchasing corporate equities
in the third quarter of 2008, as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The natural logarithm
of this short time series (which is given in Table 12 in Appendix E) has a standard deviation of
0.5671. Then by Equation (A.1),
σuNg =
√
(1− ρ2Ng)σ2Ng =
√
(1− 0.952)× 0.56712 = 0.1771
Individuals in the US pay tax on income from all sources, not on the type of income earned.
Dividend and wage tax data is not available from the US. The UK computes taxes by the type of
income, including dividend and wage taxes. Parameters related to taxation are therefore drawn
from quarterly UK data (which is given in Table 14 in Appendix E). Tax rates are computed
as ratios of aggregate taxes to aggregate incomes from wages and dividends. Tax liabilities are
used instead of actual tax receipts, to avoid the latter’s problems with over/underpayments,
late payments, etc. Standard deviations στwl = 0.004 and στrn = 0.0112 for tax rates are
observed from the data. The standard deviations of innovations to tax rates are then computed
by Equation (A.1):
σuτwl =
√
(1− ρ2τwl)σ2τwl =
√
(1− 0.952)× 0.0042 = 0.00124
σuτrn =
√
(1− ρ2τrn)σ2τrn =
√
(1− 0.952)× 0.01122 = 0.00349
King and Rebelo (2000) estimate an AR(1) process for At in natural logarithms and without
an intercept, using quarterly US data, and obtain point estimates of 0.979 for the persistence
parameter and 0.0072 for the standard deviation of the residuals. The value of 0.979 is assumed
here for ρA, and by Equation (A.1),
σuA =
√
(1− ρ2A)σ2A =
√
(1− 0.9792)0.00722 = 0.00147
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Figure 3: US liquid assets to total assets
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, US Flow of Funds Statistics, various issues; 2012
data was obtained online from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf and historical
data from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm.
NOTES: The liquidity share is calculated according to Del Negro et al. (2011). Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix E
give the data and metadata, respectively.
An annual time series of the liquidity share variable of Del Negro et al. (2011) is replicated
here by following the authors’ metadata. The data and metadata are given in Tables 10 and 11,
respectively, in Appendix E. The series is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The period 1957
– 2007 was one of relative stability for the liquidity share, within which the mean and standard
deviation are 0.1110 and 0.0204, respectively. Del Negro et al. (2011) propose that the liquidity
share is a linear function of φt with gradient of 15, which implies σφ = 0.00136.
19 Then by
Equation (A.1),
σuφ =
√
(1− ρ2φ)σ2φ =
√
(1− 0.952)× 0.001362 = 0.00042
Equation (2.17) is estimated via least squares from quarterly US data over 1987:1 – 2008:1
(i.e. 84 observations); estimation results are summarized in Table 6. Mt is taken as the season-
ally adjusted, detrended, natural logarithm of the real monetary base. Table 13 in Appendix E
provides the data and describes how the series is compiled. ρM is set to the estimated coefficient
0.952 of the lagged dependent variable in the AR(1) regression. The Dickey-Fuller test on
∆Mt = (ρM − 1)Mt−1 + uMt
19From Figure 3 on page 43 in Del Negro et al. (2011), the straight line appears to travel from 12.5 to 13.25,
or 0.75 units along the vertical axis, and from 0.15 to 0.2, or 0.05 units along the horizontal axis, thus giving a
slope of 0.75/0.05 = 15.
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Table 6: Estimation of Mt = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt−1 + uMt
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
(1− ρM )M 0.093483 0.019623 4.763995 0.0000
ρM 0.951991 0.010284 92.57203 0.0000
R-squared 0.990407 Mean dependent var 1.909519
Adjusted R-squared 0.990292 S.D. dependent var 0.042950
S.E. of regression 0.004232 Akaike info criterion -8.069100
Sum squared resid 0.001486 Schwarz criterion -8.011626
Log likelihood 344.9367 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.045982
F-statistic 8569.580 Durbin-Watson stat 0.024005
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
NOTES: This table gives the results of estimating equation (2.17) via least squares with a sample of 84 observa-
tions from 1987:1 to 2008:1. Mt is the seasonally adjusted, detrended, natural log of the real US monetary base.
The data is given in Table 13 in Appendix E.
Figure 4: Histogram of residuals in the estimation of Mt = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt−1 + uMt
with standard t-statistic,
ρˆM − 1
SE(ρˆM )
=
0.951991− 1
0.010284
≈ −5
concludes that |ρM |< 1 and Mt is a trend-stationary series. Figure 4 gives a histogram of the
residuals of the regression. Moreover, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, with p-value of 0.45, does
not provide enough statistical evidence to reject a null hypothesis that the regression residuals
are normally distributed. σuM is set to the standard deviation of the regression residuals,
0.004207.
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A.2.2 Steady state values
Values in this section are not interpretable. A is normalized to 1. As previously mentioned in
this section, φ is assumed to be equal to θ (i.e. 0.185). From Assumption 2, Ng = 0. And the
estimated regression coefficients of Equation (2.17) (in Table 6) imply a value of 1.95 for M .
While tax rates are obtained from UK data, the country does not have flat rates of tax
on wage and dividend income. In both cases the taxpayer first enjoys a taxable allowance,
and any excess amount earned during the tax year is subject to tax. The rate of tax applied
on this excess depends on the individual’s income for the fiscal year. τwl and τ rn are set to
average ratios, 0.231 and 0.207, of aggregate tax liabilities to aggregate incomes from wages and
dividends, respectively (see Table 14 in Appendix E).20
20These rates are very similar to those computed by Gomme and Rupert (2007) from US data and following a
methodology set out by Mendoza et al. (1994) and Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). Gomme and Rupert (2007)
compute income tax rates of 0.22 on wages and 0.2868 on capital. These values, however, are not adopted here
for two reasons: (i) rates are obtained from the same dataset that was used to compute σuτwl and σuτrn; (ii)
Gomme and Rupert (2007) use data on actual government tax collections, which, as said in this paper, may be
less accurate of the tax burden than tax liabilities data because of errors in tax payments. The rates obtained
here are also fairly consistent with papers that focus exclusively on tax rate calculations; Barro and Sahasakul
(1983, 1986), Seater (1985), and Stephenson (1998) obtain average wage income tax rates between 0.22 and 0.30
from US data between 1954 and 1994; and Mendoza et al. (1994) obtain average income tax rates between 0.17
and 0.30 for wages and 0.27 and 0.50 for capital.
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Appendix B Sensitivity analysis
This Appendix shows how responses to the tax shock vary with changes to the calibration of
structural parameters (θ, β, γ, δ, pi, ν, and ω) and the persistence of tax shocks (ρτrn and ρτwl).
Structural parameter sensitivity analysis is performed systematically by three local methods,
all involving repeated simulations of the shock with combinations of sensitivity settings that are
listed in Table 4: the first method uses one change in one parameter at a time; the second and
third methods use combinations of two or more sensitivity parameter values. Sensitivity to the
persistence of tax shocks is examined by repeatedly simulating the shock with simultaneous use
of values above and below the calibrated, and fairly standard, setting. The conclusions from
this Appendix are stated in Section 5.
B.1 Sensitivity to structural parameters: one-at-a-time parameter variation
The first approach to structural parameter sensitivity is a one-at-a-time (OAT) method: one
parameter is changed to one of its sensitivity settings, and all other parameters remain at the
baseline; this is done for each and every parameter and for each and every sensitivity setting that
is listed in Table 4.21 This exercise produces 12 sets of results, which are graphically illustrated
by impulse responses in Figures 5 to 11. The magnitude of immediate impulse responses from
all 12 sensitivity simulations plus the baseline are listed in Table 7.
Since their changes are due to non-uniform changes in parameter values, impulse responses
are unsuitable for comparing different scenarios, or for establishing a common criteria to assess
sensitivity. An indicator of sensitivity to a particular parameter is constructed for these pur-
poses. The indicator is a ratio of the percentage change in a variable’s first quarter impulse
response to the percentage change in a parameter’s value. The indicator is henceforth referred
to as a “parameter elasticity of impulse response”.22 A positive elasticity means an increase
(or decrease, respectively) in the parameter’s value amplifies (or dampens, respectively) the
variable’s immediate impulse response relative to that of the baseline scenario. A negative
elasticity means that an increase (or decrease, respectively) in the parameter’s value dampens
(or amplifies, respectively) the variable’s immediate impulse response relative to that of the
baseline scenario. A variable is considered sensitive to a parameter if the absolute value of the
elasticity is greater than 1. The model is considered sensitive to a parameter if the majority of
the variables are sensitive to that parameter. Elasticities from all 12 repeated simulations are
given in Table 8.
B.1.1 Liquidity constraints
Figure 5 illustrates the difference in impulse responses among the baseline setting and higher
and lower sensitivity settings of θ and φ. The graphs show little variation in impulse responses.
Moreover, parameter elasticities are less than unity in absolute value for all variables except Cit ,
N st , and pt. The model can therefore be considered not sensitive to the calibration of liquidity
21This method is similar to the “one-factor-at-a-time” method of Morris (1991), but without randomly selecting
parameter values.
22The parameter elasticity resembles the “elementary effects” ratio of Morris (1991).
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with lower and higher θ
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NOTES: Vertical axes measure percentage deviation from steady state. Horizontal axes measure quarters after
the shock, starting from quarter 1. Impulse responses for {Kt, Nst } occur at the end of the quarter. Table 7 gives
first quarter impulse responses.
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constraint parameters, ceteris paribus, once they are tight enough to allow the model to converge
to a unique equilibrium.
The replacement cost of equity is inversely influenced by the borrowing constraint (see Ap-
pendix C.9). Either directly or indirectly through qRt , the liquidity constraints enter negatively
into investors’ consumption (Equation (2.44)) and positively into investment and equity’s sup-
ply (Equations (2.42) and (2.48), respectively). Following a tax shock, the tighter the liquidity
constraints (i.e. the lower the values of θ and φ), then the higher the increase in investors’
consumption and the lower the increases in equity’s supply and investment; and conversely.
This explains why It and C
i
t have positive and negative parameter elasticities, respectively. It
also explains why money’s price is the most sensitive variable to this parameter: from a tax
shock, the tighter the liquidity constraints, the smaller the increase in equity’s supply, and the
greater the increase in equity’s price (as if SN1 is more to the left than it appears in Figure 2A);
then by a portfolio balance effect, the greater are the increases in money’s demand and price.
KM observe this movement from equity to money when liquidity constraints tighten, in what
they called a “flight to liquidity”. Ceteris paribus, a tightening of liquidity constraints worsens
the appeal of partially liquid assets (i.e. equity) and encourages agents to substitute towards
more liquid assets (i.e. money), and thereby increases the price of liquid assets; and conversely.
B.1.2 Subjective discount factor
Parameter elasticities indicate that the shock responses of all variables are very sensitive to
changes in β; Figure 6 graphically illustrates this. In fact, looking at all the elasticities in
Table 8 shows that β produces the greatest amount of sensitivity in all of the OAT simula-
tions. Elasticities are asymmetric, and indicate that the model is more sensitive to raising the
parameter’s value above baseline.
β enters negatively in entrepreneurs’ consumption (Equations (2.44) and (2.45)). Ceteris
paribus, increasing β means entrepreneurs are more willing to delay consumption and spend
their net worth more evenly over time.23 As their patience increase, they consume less in the
present. This explains the negative parameter elasticities for Cit and C
s
t with higher β. The
consequences are higher levels of current saving and investment. Combined with a tax shock,
increasing β amplifies the shock-induced increases in asset demands. For money, this means a
larger price increase compared to the baseline scenario, hence the positive parameter elasticity
for pt. For equity, there is also a larger supply response; the market adjusts to the shock with a
smaller price increase than in the baseline scenario, hence the positive parameter elasticity for
pt. These variations in asset price impulse responses then propagate throughout the economy.
Conversely, ceteris paribus, lowering β means entrepreneurs become more impatient and con-
sume more of their net worth in the present; this implies less saving and investment, and lower
asset demands and equity supply. Combined with a tax shock, lowering β produces a smaller
increase in pt and a larger increase in qt. Asset price increases feed back into improvements
in entrepreneurs’ net worth. Investors therefore consume more. This is why Cit has a positive
parameter elasticity with lower β. In other words, investors increase their consumption because
23Given that workers’ optimal behaviour involves them not saving for the future (from Equation (2.46)), then
such changes are confined to entrepreneurs.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with lower and higher β
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NOTES: See the notes in Figure 5.
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of the net worth improvements they enjoy from shock-induced asset price increases; varying β
up or down does not interfere with this, hence the difference in the sign of parameter elasticities
for Cit . Net worth improvements also increase saving and investment. However, lowering β only
partially offsets the increase in savings but completely offsets the increase in investment, hence
the negative and positive parameter elasticities for Cst and It, respectively.
B.1.3 Capital’s share in output
This is another parameter for which the model is sensitive to its calibrated value. Figure 7
illustrates this. Elasticities are greater than 1 in absolute value for all variables except Lt
and qt. The only variables with negative elasticities are qt and rt; impulse responses of other
variables are thus smaller when γ is lowered.
γ enters the aggregate labour demand and production functions (Equations (2.35) and (2.49),
respectively). Ceteris paribus, lowering γ positions the inverse aggregate labour demand func-
tion leftwards from its baseline calibration; this is illustrated in the first graph of Figure 12.
Lowering γ therefore dampens the shock-induced increases in the real wage and labour, and
hence output. This explains the positive parameter elasticities of wt, Lt, and Yt. The changes
in the goods market then propagate throughout the economy.
B.1.4 Survival rate of capital after depreciation
Figure 8 shows small differences in tax shock impulse responses between baseline and higher
δ settings. But the change in δ’s setting is very small, and parameter elasticities reveal the
change in quarter 1 impulse responses to be relatively much larger. Elasticities are all above 20
in absolute value, making shock responses very sensitive to the parameter’s value. In fact, this
parameter is the second most sensitive, after β.
Ceteris paribus, a higher δ means capital and equity stocks retain more of their value after
depreciation each period. This effectively provides net worth improvements to entrepreneurs.
The consequences are amplified when combined with the shock. However, increasing β improves
the appeal of equity. The shock-induced increase in demand for equity is thus amplified, and
creates a larger fall in qt (as if D
N
1 is further to the right than it appears in Figure 2A). This
explains the negative parameter elasticity for pt. Moreover, investors are able to invest more,
given net worth improvements, and issue more equity, given its greater appeal. They sacrifice
consumption for much more investment, hence the negative parameter elasticity for Cit .
B.1.5 Probability of investment opportunity
Changing the value of pi does not significantly alter impulse responses, except for pt. This is
seen in the deviations of impulse response graphs in Figure 9. Elasticities are fairly similar
between lowering and raising the parameter’s value relative to its baseline setting.
pi enters positively into investors’ consumption (Equation (2.44)), investment (Equation (2.48)),
and the supply of equity (Equation (2.42)), and negatively into savers’ consumption (Equa-
tion (2.45)). Ceteris paribus, raising the value of pi increases the population of investors relative
to savers, and conversely. Changing the parameter’s value therefore shifts activity between
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulation with lower γ
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulation with higher δ
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with lower and higher pi
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NOTES: See the notes in Figure 5.
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investment and saving. The significant changes occur in the asset markets, but these are out-
weighed by the effects of the tax shock. The economy is therefore hardly affected by variation
in the parameter’s value, hence the very small elasticities for most variables.
Since a higher pi means a smaller population of savers, then the shock-induced increase in
money’s demand is smaller compared to the baseline scenario (as if DM1 in Figure 2B is further
to the left than where it is drawn). The increase in pt is smaller, hence the negative parameter
elasticity. This implies a larger fall in the expected return on money. The portfolio balance
effect is stronger, i.e. the substitution-led increase in equity’s demand is greater, which produces
a greater price increase, and therefore a positive parameter elasticity for qt. The converse is
true for a lower pi.
B.1.6 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
Figure 10 shows some variation in impulse responses from changes in ν. Parameter elasticities
indicate that a minority of variables are sensitive to the parameter, and even then, the elasticities
are marginally above 1. Elasticities indicate that the model is more sensitive to lowering the
parameter. Overall, the model cannot be considered sensitive to the calibration of ν.
Changing the value of ν affects the economy through the aggregate labour supply function.
The baseline setting ν = 1 makes the inverse function (Equation (2.36)) linear in wt. If ν <
1 then the inverse function is convex, and ν > 1 makes it concave. The second graph of
Figure 12 illustrates these variations in shape of labour market curves. These variations are
largely responsible for any deviations of impulse responses from the baseline scenario.
B.1.7 Relative utility weight on labour
Although large deviations in impulse responses are shown in Figure 11, these are brought on
by large changes in the value of ω, especially from raising the value above baseline. Parameter
elasticities provide a more accurate means of assessing sensitivity. They indicate that the
model is not sensitive to raising the parameter’s value; no variable has an elasticity above 1
in absolute value. However, lowering the parameter’s value produces large elasticities for most
variables. Changes in ω in both directions have no effect on wt, rt, and qt, and produces the
same parameter elasticity with the other variables. The overall conclusion is that the model is
sensitive to lowering the parameter’s value, but not to raising it.
ω positively determines the slope of the inverse aggregate labour supply function (Equa-
tion (2.36)). The last graph of Figure 12 illustrates how varying ω, ceteris paribus, affects the
labour market. The remarks said above about changes in ν can also be said about ω.
B.2 Sensitivity to structural parameters: combinations of sensitivity settings
The second and third approaches both use combinations of sensitivity settings that are listed
in Table 4; for ease of reference, they are called the “Sensitive Combinations” and “All Combi-
nations” methods, respectively.
The Sensitive Combinations method (henceforth SC) uses combinations for only those struc-
tural parameters which the OAT method determines that the model is sensitive to, i.e. β, γ,
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Figure 10: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with lower and higher ν
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Figure 11: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with lower and higher ω
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Figure 12: Labour market sensitivity to γ, ν and ω
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NOTES: These graphs plot Equations (2.35) and (2.36) using steady state levels of the capital stock and total
factor productivity and sensitivity settings for γ, ν and ω that are listed in Table 4.
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Table 7: Immediate impulse responses of a tax shock: baseline and one-at-a-time parameter variation
Baseline
θ β γ δ pi ν ω
L H L H L H L H L H L H
Tt −3.1 −3.1 −3.1 −2.0 −5.1 −1.8 −3.8 −2.9 −3.3 −1.4 −4.6 −3.6 −1.5
Yt 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.8 0.7 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.5
It 1.9 1.8 1.9 0.9 4.0 1.0 2.2 1.7 2.0 1.0 2.6 2.2 0.9
Ct 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 2.9 1.5 3.0 2.2 2.4 1.2 3.0 2.7 1.1
Cwt 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.0 2.7 1.1 2.1 1.6 1.7 0.9 2.1 1.9 0.8
Cit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cst 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.3
N st 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2
wt −0.9 −0.9 −0.9 −0.7 −1.2 −0.7 −1.0 −0.9 −0.9 −1.4 −0.5 −0.9 −0.9
Lt 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2
rt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kt 1.9 1.8 1.9 0.9 4.0 1.0 2.2 1.7 2.0 1.0 2.6 2.2 0.9
pt 6.6 7.8 5.4 2.2 18.2 3.6 5.3 9.6 3.0 3.5 8.9 7.8 3.3
qt 3.2 3.2 3.3 4.2 2.5 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.2
NOTES: This table gives the percentage deviations from steady state in quarter 1 for baseline and one-at-a-time
sensitivity scenarios. “L” and “H” refer to the lower and higher sensitivity parameter values, respectively, that
are listed in Table 4. Impulse responses for stock variables {Kt, Nst } occur at the end of the quarter.
and δ. The SC uses 10 combinations of parameter values.24 The SC builds upon the screening
that the OAT method performs, and attempts to capture two or more sensitivity settings from
β, γ, and δ that, when combined, produce shock responses that deviate significantly from the
baseline. Impulse responses for the SC are presented graphically in Figure 13. Relying on
graphical inspection, the SC concludes that responses to the tax shock vary only in magnitude
to the calibration of the model, i.e. different assumptions about structural parameters do not
change the sign of initial responses or the shape of trajectories.25
The All Combinations method (henceforth AC) is more inclusive that the SC, and uses
combinations of sensitivity settings from all structural parameters. The AC uses 754 combina-
tions of parameter values, which includes the 10 combinations that are used in the SC.26 The
objective of the AC is to capture any sensitive combination of two or more parameter values
outside of those considered in the SC. The AC also avoids any selection bias that the SC may
have, despite identification by the OAT method of which parameters are key drivers of sensi-
tivity. Impulse response graphs of the AC closely resemble those in Figure 13 (they are just
more densely populated) and are not reported, to avoid repetition. The conclusion of the SC is
24An 11th combination of {β = 0.999, γ = 0.4, δ = 0.98} does not allow the model to converge to a unique
equilibrium.
25The literature lacks criteria by which results of such an analysis are to be interpreted; a survey by Andronis
et al. (2009) concludes this. Here, the objective is to observe any change in direction or trajectory of impulse
responses and to recognize significantly different impulse responses from those of the baseline scenario.
26An additional 217 combinations from the AC do not allow the model to converge to a unique equilibrium.
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Table 8: Parameter elasticities of impulse responses
θ β γ δ pi ν ω
L H L H L H L H L H L H
Tt 0.1 0.1 36.3 71.9 4.2 47.4 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.5 −1.2 −0.5
Yt 0.1 0.1 36.3 71.9 3.3 47.4 0.2 0.1 0.5 −0.2 −1.2 −0.5
It 0.2 0.2 50.5 126.0 4.4 34.4 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.4 −1.2 −0.5
Ct 0.1 0.1 24.7 27.5 3.6 58.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.3 −1.2 −0.5
Cwt 0.1 0.1 36.3 71.9 3.3 47.4 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 −1.2 −0.5
Cit −1.4 −1.5 24.5 −81.8 4.5 −25.9 0.0 −0.6 1.0 0.4 −1.2 −0.5
Cst 0.0 0.0 −5.9 −88.0 4.4 87.1 −0.2 0.0 1.0 0.4 −1.2 −0.5
N st 1.2 1.2 50.5 126.0 4.4 34.4 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.4 −1.2 −0.5
wt 0.1 0.1 20.2 31.4 2.5 22.4 0.1 0.1 −1.1 −0.4 0.0 0.0
Lt 0.1 0.1 20.2 31.4 1.7 22.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 −0.2 −1.2 −0.5
rt −0.1 −0.1 −40.5 −34.6 −1.0 −29.4 −0.2 −0.1 −1.1 −0.4 0.0 0.0
Kt 0.2 0.2 50.5 126.0 4.4 34.4 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.4 −1.2 −0.5
pt −1.7 −1.8 66.7 191.1 4.5 −40.1 −1.7 −1.4 1.0 0.3 −1.2 −0.5
qt 0.2 0.2 −28.0 −26.6 −0.2 20.2 −0.1 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
NOTES: This table gives the percentage change in first quarter impulse responses as a ratio to the percentage
change in a single parameter value. “L” and “H” refer to the lower and higher sensitivity parameter values,
respectively, that are listed in Table 4. A positive elasticity means an increase (or decrease, respectively) in
the parameter’s value amplifies (or dampens, respectively) the variable’s first quarter impulse response relative
to that of the baseline scenario. A negative elasticity means that an increase (or decrease, respectively) in the
parameter’s value dampens (or amplifies, respectively) the variable’s first quarter impulse response relative to
that of the baseline scenario. A variable is considered sensitive to a parameter if the absolute value of the elasticity
is greater than 1. The model is considered sensitive to a parameter if the majority of the variables are sensitive
to that parameter.
therefore supported by the AC.
Box plots of immediate impulse responses from both SC and AC are presented in Figure 14.
Two conclusions are drawn from inspecting Figure 14. Firstly, with the exception of Cit , baseline
responses (marked by a red cross) are not extreme. Secondly, the AC produces more extreme
first quarter impulse responses than the SC; since SC combinations are a subset of those used
in the AC, then Figure 14 indicates that not only do the parameters identified by the OAT
method cause sensitivity, but also certain combinations of any of the parameter values.
B.3 Sensitivity to the persistence of tax shocks
Sensitivity to the persistence of tax shocks, ρτwl and ρτrn, are examined by repeatedly simulating
the tax shock with simultaneous use of two values above (0.99 and 0.96) and three values below
(0.94, 0.88, and 0.10) the “baseline” setting (0.95). Baseline values of structural parameters are
maintained. Results are illustrated graphically by impulse responses in two ways: Figure 15 gives
the usual 200-quarter horizon graphs and shows the variation in adjustment path trajectories,
and Figure 16 gives a close-up of the first 20 quarters and shows the divergence of trajectories
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Figure 13: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with combinations of sensitivity
settings for β, γ and δ
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Baseline
NOTES: These graphs plot impulse responses from the “Sensitive Combinations” approach to structural pa-
rameter sensitivity. They show impulse responses to the tax shock from 10 repeated simulations with com-
binations of all sensitivity settings for β, γ and δ that are listed in Table 4. An 11th combination of
{β = 0.999, γ = 0.4, δ = 0.98} does not allow the model to converge to a unique equilibrium.
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Figure 14: Range of immediate impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with combina-
tions of sensitivity settings
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NOTES: These box plots show the 25th and 75th percentiles, median, largest and smallest immediate impulse
responses from the Sensitive Combinations (labelled “Sens.”) and All Combinations (labelled “All”) approaches
to structural parameter sensitivity. Vertical axes measure percentage deviation from steady state. Red crosses
indicate the baseline immediate impulse responses.
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after the shock’s initial impact. Table 9 gives an indicator of the speed of convergence to steady
state: the time it takes for impulse responses to fall within 10% of their initial shock impacts.
Very small changes from the “baseline”, by ±1 basis point, does not significantly alter the
responses of any variable. When ρτwl and ρτrn are both increased and decreased to 0.96 and
0.94, respectively, Figure 15 show that the shape and speed of adjustment paths change by
very little. Figure 15 also shows that a persistence close to unity, i.e. an increase by 4 basis
points, significantly amplifies adjustment paths. All variables except aggregate taxes, Tt, and
asset prices, pt and qt, now exhibit hump-shaped trajectories and very long shock persistence.
Those that had hum-shapes before now have exaggerated humps. For any setting below 0.88,
output loses its hump-shaped trajectory. At these levels of persistence, investment falls rapidly
towards steady state, and is quickly outpaced by an increasing depreciation.
Reducing the persistence parameter down to very low levels reveals those variables whose
shock propagations are driven by features of the model. The slowest variables to adjust are
(in order) investment, savers’ equity, capital, investors’ consumption, and output. As shown
in Table 9, even at the lowest persistence (an implausible 0.10), It and N
s
t take more than
200 quarters to converge; Yt takes more than 5 years, and this is due to the slow convergence
of Kt. The impulse response analysis of the tax shock suggests that investment is supported
by asset prices, and consequently net worth, being above steady state levels throughout the
process of adjustment; elevated asset prices are, in turn, due to binding liquidity constraints;
and once investment is above steady state and below depreciation, the capital stock increases,
and so does output. The liquidity constraints are therefore an amplifying feature for the the
internal propagation mechanism (i.e. investment-capital-output relationship), or an “internal
amplification” mechanism.
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Figure 15: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with varying persistence of shocks
to τwlt and τ
rn
t
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NOTES: These graphs plot impulse responses to the tax shock from repeated simulations with lower-than-baseline
settings for persistence parameters ρτwl and ρτrn. Figure 16 give a close-up of the first 20 quarters.
52
Figure 16: Impulse responses of a tax shock: repeated simulations with varying persistence of shocks
to τwlt and τ
rn
t : 20 quarters
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NOTES: These graphs show the first 20 quarters of Figure 15.
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Table 9: Quarters after the tax shock when impulse responses converge to within 10% of immediate
responses: repeated simulations with varying persistence of shocks to τwlt and τ
rn
t
(baseline)
ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.50 0.10
Tt 90 36 30 27 18 16 15 9 4 1
Yt 200 200 200 200 197 188 181 138 66 21
It 200 116 93 76 38 33 29 14 4 2
Ct 200 193 168 150 102 93 86 43 5 2
Cwt 200 196 172 154 106 98 91 48 5 2
Cit 200 200 200 200 200 200 194 156 90 46
Cst 200 180 155 135 86 77 69 27 5 2
N st 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
wt 200 200 200 200 175 167 159 117 44 1
Lt 200 196 172 153 106 98 90 48 5 2
rt 200 200 200 200 175 167 159 117 44 1
Kt 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 181
pt 200 60 48 39 23 21 19 11 4 2
qt 99 41 35 30 19 18 16 10 4 1
NOTES: This table gives the period of time its takes for impulse responses to get within 10% of their quarter 1
magnitudes. Convergence of 200 quarters means some time after 200 quarters, and not in the 200th quarter.
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Appendix C Additional algebra
C.1 The investor’s budget and resource constraints
Substituting Equation (2.21) into Equation (2.5) gives
cit +
1
1− θn
i
t+1 −
1− φt
1− θ δnt + qt
[
nit+1 −
1
1− θn
i
t+1 +
1− φt
1− θ δnt − δnt
]
+ pt(m
i
t+1 −mt)
= (1− τ rnt )rtnt
=⇒ cit +
[
1
1− θ + qt − qt
1
1− θ
]
nit+1 = (1− τ rnt )rtnt +
[
1− φt
1− θ − qt
1− φt
1− θ + qt
]
δnt
+ pt(mt −mit+1)
The coefficients of nit+1 and δnt in the above is simplified as follows:
1
1− θ + qt − qt
1
1− θ =
1
1− θ + qt
[
1− 1
1− θ
]
=
1
1− θ + qt
[
1− θ − 1
1− θ
]
=
1
1− θ − qt
θ
1− θ
=
1− θqt
1− θ ≡ q
R
t
1− φt
1− θ − qt
1− φt
1− θ + qt =
1− φt
1− θ + qt
[
1− 1− φt
1− θ
]
=
1− φt
1− θ + qt
[
1− θ − 1 + φt
1− θ
]
=
1− φt
1− θ + qt
[−θ + φt
1− θ
]
=
1− φt − θqt + φtqt
1− θ
=
1− φt − θqt + φtθqt − φtθqt + φtqt
1− θ
=
(1− φt)(1− θqt) + φtqt(1− θ)
1− θ
= (1− φt)1− θqt
1− θ + φtqt
= (1− φt)qRt + φtqt
thus giving the modified budget constraint (2.22),
cit + q
R
t n
i
t+1 = (1− τ rnt )rtnt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
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Alternatively, substituting Equation (2.20) into Equation (2.5) gives the resource constraint
(2.24),
cit + it + qt[(1− θ)it + (1− φt)δnt − it − δnt] + pt(mit+1 −mt) = (1− τ rnt )rtnt
=⇒ cit + it + qt(1− θ)it + qt(1− φt)δnt − qtit − qtδnt = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
=⇒ cit + it[1 + qt(1− θ)− qt] + [(1− φt)− 1]qtδnt = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
=⇒ cit + it[1− θqt] + [−φt]qtδnt = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
=⇒ cit + (1− θqt)it = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + φtqtδnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
C.2 Entrepreneurs’ first order conditions
From Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.22), the investor’s Lagrangian is
Lie = Ue(cit)− λit
(
cit + q
R
t n
i
t+1 − (1− τ rnt )rtnt − [φtqt + (1− φt)qRt ]δnt − pt(mt −mit+1)
)
+ piEt
[
β
{
Ue(c
i
t+1)− λit+1
(
cit+1 + q
R
t+1n
i
t+2 − (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nit+1 − [φt+1qt+1
+ (1− φt+1)qRt+1]δnit+1 − pt+1(mit+1 −mit+2)
)}
+ β2
{
Ue(c
i
t+2)− λit+2
(
cit+2 + q
R
t+2n
i
t+3
− (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nit+2 − [φt+2qt+2 + (1− φt+2)qRt+2]δnit+2 − pt+2(mit+2 −mit+3)
)}
+ . . .
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[
β
{
Ue(c
s
t+1)− λst+1
(
cst+1 + qt+1(n
s
t+2 − δnst+1) + pt+1(mst+2 −mst+1)
− (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nst+1
)}
+ β2
{
Ue(c
s
t+2)− λst+2
(
cst+2 + qt+2(n
s
t+3 − δnst+2)
+ pt+2(m
s
t+3 −mst+2)− (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nst+2
)}
+ . . .
]
which gives first order conditions
∂Lie
∂cit
= U ′e(c
i
t)− λit = 0
=⇒ λit = U ′e(cit) (C.1)
∂Lie
∂cit+1
= piEt[β{U ′e(cit+1)− λit+1}] + (1− pi)Et[β{U ′e(cst+1)− λst+1}] = 0
=⇒ βEt[piU ′e(cit+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)] = βEt[piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1]
=⇒ piU ′e(cit+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1) = piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1 (C.2)
∂Lie
∂nit+1
= −λitqRt + piEt[βλit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)]
+ (1− pi)Et[βλst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)] = 0
=⇒ λitqRt = βpiEt
[
λit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)
]
+ β(1− pi)Et
[
λst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)
]
(C.3)
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∂Lie
∂mit+1
= −λitpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] ≤ 0, mit+1 ≥ 0,
and {−λitpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1]}mit+1 = 0
=⇒ −λitpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] = 0 or mit+1 = 0
=⇒ λitpt = piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] or mit+1 = 0
=⇒ λit = βEt
[
pt+1
pt
(
piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1
)]
or mit+1 = 0 (C.4)
From Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.22), the saver’s Lagrangian is
Lse = Ue(cst )− λst
(
cst + qt(n
s
t+1 − δnt) + pt(mst+1 −mt)− (1− τ rnt )rtnt
)
+ piEt
[
β
{
Ue(c
i
t+1)− λit+1
(
cit+1 + q
R
t+1n
i
t+2 − (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nit+1 − [φt+1qt+1
+ (1− φt+1)qRt+1]δnit+1 − pt+1(mit+1 −mit+2)
)}
+ β2
{
Ue(c
i
t+2)− λit+2
(
cit+2 + q
R
t+2n
i
t+3
− (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nit+2 − [φt+2qt+2 + (1− φt+2)qRt+2]δnit+2 − pt+2(mit+2 −mit+3)
)}
+ . . .
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[
β
{
Ue(c
s
t+1)− λst+1
(
cst+1 + qt+1(n
s
t+2 − δnst+1) + pt+1(mst+2 −mst+1)
− (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nst+1
)}
+ β2
{
Ue(c
s
t+2)− λst+2
(
cst+2 + qt+2(n
s
t+3 − δnst+2)
+ pt+2(m
s
t+3 −mst+2)− (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nst+2
)}
+ . . .
]
which gives first order conditions
∂Lse
∂cst
= U ′e(c
s
t )− λst = 0
=⇒ λst = U ′e(cst ) (C.5)
∂Lse
∂nst+1
= −λstqt + piEt[βλit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)]
+ (1− pi)Et[βλst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)] = 0
=⇒ λstqt = βpiEt[λit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)]
+ β(1− pi)Et[λst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)] (C.6)
=⇒ λst = βpiEt
[
1
qt
λit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)
]
+ β(1− pi)Et
[
1
qt
λst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)
]
(C.7)
∂Lse
∂mst+1
= −λstpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] = 0
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=⇒ λstpt = piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1]
=⇒ λst = βEt
[
pt+1
pt
(
piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1
)]
(C.8)
From Equations (C.7) and (C.8),
λst
β
= piEt
[
1
qt
λit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[
1
qt
λst+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1)
]
= Et
[
pt+1
pt
(
piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1
)]
From Equations (C.1) and (C.5), respectively, λit+1 = U
′
e(c
i
t+1) and λ
s
t+1 = U
′
e(c
s
t+1), and
substituting Equation (C.2) gives
piEt
[
1
qt
([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)U ′e(cit+1)
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[
1
qt
([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1)U ′e(cst+1)
]
= Et
[
pt+1
pt
(
piU ′e(c
i
t+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)
)]
C.3 The portfolio balance equation
The Euler equation (2.25) simplifies as follows:
piEt
[
1
qt
([1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)U ′e(cit+1)
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[
1
qt
([1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1)U
′
e(c
s
t+1)
]
= Et
[
pt+1
pt
(
piU ′e(c
i
t+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)
)]
=⇒ piEt
[(
pt+1
pt
)
U ′e(c
i
t+1)
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[(
pt+1
pt
)
U ′e(c
s
t+1)
]
= piEt
[(
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
U ′e(c
i
t+1)
]
+ (1− pi)Et
[(
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
)
U ′e(c
s
t+1)
]
=⇒ piEt
[(
pt+1
pt
)
U ′e(c
i
t+1)
]
− piEt
[(
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
U ′e(c
i
t+1)
]
= (1− pi)Et
[(
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
)
U ′e(c
s
t+1)
]
− (1− pi)Et
[(
pt+1
pt
)
U ′e(c
s
t+1)
]
=⇒ piEt
[(
pt+1
pt
− [1 + τ
rn
t+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
U ′e(c
i
t+1)
]
= (1− pi)Et
[(
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
− pt+1
pt
)
U ′e(c
s
t+1)
]
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=⇒ piEt

(
pt+1
pt
− [1+τ
rn
t+1]rt+1+φt+1δqt+1+[1−φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
cit+1
 = (1− pi)Et

(
[1+τrnt+1]rt+1+δqt+1
qt
− pt+1pt
)
cst+1

Then by Equations (2.26) and (2.27), the last line above becomes
piEt

(
pt+1
pt
)
−
(
[1+τrnt+1]rt+1+φt+1δqt+1+[1−φt+1]δqRt+1
qt
)
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1nt+1 + [φt+1qt+1 + (1− φt+1)qRt+1]δnt+1 + pt+1mt+1

= (1− pi)Et

(
[1+τrnt+1]rt+1+δqt+1
qt
)
−
(
pt+1
pt
)
[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1nt+1 + qt+1δnt+1 + pt+1mt+1

C.4 Proof of Claim 1
The RHS of Equations (C.3) and (C.6) are identical, thus giving
λitq
R
t = λ
s
tqt
and from Equations (C.4) and (C.8),
mit+1 6= 0 ⇐⇒ λit = λst
⇐⇒ qRt = qt
⇐⇒ 1− θqt
1− θ = qt
⇐⇒ qt = 1
∴ mit+1 = 0 ⇐⇒ qt 6= 1
C.5 Implication of Assumption 1
qt > 1 =⇒ θqt > θ
=⇒ 1− θqt < 1− θ
=⇒ 1− θqt
1− θ < 1
i.e. qRt < 1
=⇒ qRt < qt
=⇒ qRt+1 < qt+1
=⇒ (1 + τ
rn
t+1)rt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqRt+1
qt
<
(1 + τ rnt+1)rt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqt+1
qt
=⇒ (1 + τ
rn
t+1)rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqRt+1
qt
<
(1 + τ rnt+1)rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
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C.6 The worker’s first order conditions
From Equations (2.9) and (2.10) the worker’s Lagrangian is
Lw = Et
[ ∞∑
j=t
βj−tUw(cwj , l
w
j )− λwt
(
cwt + qt(n
w
t+1 − δnwt ) + pt(mwt+1 −mwt )− (1− τwlt )wtlwt
− (1− τ rnt )rtnwt
)]
= Uw(c
w
t , l
w
t )− λwt
(
cwt + qt(n
w
t+1 − δnwt ) + pt(mwt+1 −mwt )− (1− τwlt )wtlwt − (1− τ rnt )rtnwt
)
+ βEt
[
Uw(c
w
t+1, l
w
t+1)− λwt+1
(
cwt+1 + qt+1(n
w
t+2 − δnwt+1) + pt+1(mwt+2 −mwt+1)
− (1− τwlt+1)wt+1lwt+1 − (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nwt+1
)]
+ β2Et
[
Uw(c
w
t+2, l
w
t+2)− λwt+2
(
cwt+2
+ qt+2(n
w
t+3 − δnwt+2) + pt+2(mwt+3 −mwt+2)− (1− τwlt+2)wt+2lwt+2 − (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nwt+2
)]
+ . . .
which gives first order conditions
∂Lw
∂cwt
=
∂Uw
∂cwt
− λwt = 0
=⇒ λwt =
∂Uw
∂cwt
= 1 (C.9)
∂Lw
∂lwt
=
∂Uw
∂lwt
+ λwt (1− τwlt )wt = 0
=⇒ ω(lwt )ν = λwt (1− τwlt )wt (C.10)
∂Lw
∂nwt+1
= −λwt qt + βEt[λwt+1(δqt+1 + [1− τwlt+1]rt+1)] ≤ 0, nwt+1 ≥ 0,
and {−λwt qt + βEt[λwt+1(δqt+1 + [1− τwlt+1]rt+1)]}nwt+1 = 0
=⇒ λwt = βEt
[
δqt+1 + [1− τwlt+1]rt+1
qt
λwt+1
]
or nwt+1 = 0 (C.11)
∂Lw
∂mwt+1
= −λwt pt + βEt[λwt+1pt+1] = 0, mwt+1 ≥ 0, and {−λwt pt + βEt[λwt+1pt+1]}mwt+1 = 0
=⇒ λwt = βEt
[
pt+1
pt
λwt+1
]
or mwt+1 = 0 (C.12)
Substituting Equation (C.9) into Equation (C.10) gives
ω(lwt )
ν = (1− τwlt )wt =⇒ lwt =
[
(1− τwlt )wt
ω
] 1
ν
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C.7 Labour market equilibrium
From Equation (2.33) and Equation (2.33), LSt = L
D
t implies
[
(1− τwlt )wt
ω
] 1
ν
= Kt
[
(1− γ)At
wt
] 1
γ
=⇒ w
1
ν
t w
1
γ
t =
Ktω
1
ν [(1− γ)At]
1
γ
(1− τwlt )
1
ν
=⇒ w
γ+ν
νγ
t =
Ktω
1
ν [(1− γ)At]
1
γ
(1− τwlt )
1
ν
=⇒ wt =
Ktω 1ν [(1− γ)At] 1γ
(1− τwlt )
1
ν

νγ
γ+ν
=
K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
γ
γ+ν [(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
(1− τwlt )
γ
γ+ν
Then the quantity of labour is
Lt =
[
(1− τwlt )wt
ω
] 1
ν
=
[
(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1
ν
w
1
ν
t
=
[
(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1
ν
K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
γ
γ+ν [(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
(1− τwlt )
γ
γ+ν

1
ν
=
(1− τwlt )
ω
× K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
γ
γ+ν [(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
(1− τwlt )
γ
γ+ν

1
ν
=
K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
γ
γ+ν−1[(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
(1− τwlt )
γ
γ+ν−1

1
ν
=
K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
−ν
γ+ν [(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
(1− τwlt )
−ν
γ+ν

1
ν
=
[
K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
−ν
γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
] 1
ν
= K
γ
γ+ν
t ω
− 1γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
1
γ+ν
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C.8 Aggregate output and gross profit
Substituting Equation (2.38) into Equation (2.49) gives aggregate output,
Yt = AtK
γ
t
[
K
γ
γ+ν
t ω
− 1γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
1
γ+ν
]1−γ
= AtK
γ
t K
γ(1−γ)
γ+ν
t ω
− 1−γγ+ν (1− τwlt )
1−γ
γ+ν (1− γ)
1−γ
γ+νA
1−γ
γ+ν
t
= ω
− 1−γγ+ν (1− γ)
1−γ
γ+ν (1− τwlt )
1−γ
γ+νA
1−γ
γ+ν+1
t K
γ(1−γ)
γ+ν +γ
t
=
[
(1− γ)(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1−γ
γ+ν
A
1−γ+γ+ν
γ+ν
t K
γ−γ2+γ2+γν
γ+ν
t
=
[
(1− γ)(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1−γ
γ+ν
A
1+ν
γ+ν
t K
γ(1+ν)
γ+ν
t
Then from Equations (2.37) and (2.38), (2.50) for aggregate gross profit becomes
rtKt =
[
(1− γ)(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1−γ
γ+ν
A
1+ν
γ+ν
t K
γ(1+ν)
γ+ν
t −
[
K
νγ
γ+ν
t ω
γ
γ+ν (1− τwlt )−
γ
γ+ν [(1− γ)At]
ν
γ+ν
]
×[
K
γ
γ+ν
t ω
− 1γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
1
γ+ν
]
=
[
(1− γ)(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1−γ
ν+γ
A
1+ν
ν+γ
t K
γ(1+ν)
ν+γ
t − (1− γ)
1+ν
ν+γ ω
γ−1
ν+γ (1− τwlt )
1−γ
ν+γA
1+ν
ν+γ
t K
γ(1+ν)
ν+γ
t
=
(
(1− γ)
1−γ
ν+γ − (1− γ)
1+ν
ν+γ
)[
1
ω
] 1−γ
ν+γ
(1− τwlt )
1−γ
ν+γA
1+ν
ν+γ
t K
γ(1+ν)
ν+γ
t
=
(
1− (1− γ)
ν+γ
ν+γ
)
(1− γ)
1−γ
ν+γ
[
1
ω
] 1−γ
ν+γ
(1− τwlt )
1−γ
ν+γA
1+ν
ν+γ
t K
γ(1+ν)
ν+γ
t
= γ
[
(1− γ)(1− τwlt )
ω
] 1−γ
ν+γ
A
1+ν
ν+γ
t K
γ(1+ν)
ν+γ
t
= atK
α
t
C.9 The qRt -θ relationship
qRt = (1− θqt)(1− θ)−1
=⇒ ∂q
R
t
∂θ
= (1− θ)−1 ∂
∂θ
(1− θqt) + (1− θqt) ∂
∂θ
(1− θ)−1
= (1− θ)−1(−qt) + (1− θqt)(1− θ)−2
= − qt
1− θ +
1− θqt
(1− θ)2
= −qt(1− θ)
(1− θ)2 +
1− θqt
(1− θ)2
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=
−qt + θqt + 1− θqt
(1− θ)2
=
1− qt
(1− θ)2
By Assumption 1, 1− qt < 0 and therefore ∂q
R
t
∂θ
< 0 for all values of θ.
C.10 Standard deviation of innovations to exogenous variables: derivation
of Equation (A.1)
Consider recursive substitutions of the following AR(1) model for Xt:
Xt = (1− ρX)X + ρXXt−1 + uXt
= (1− ρX)X + ρX
[
(1− ρX)X + ρXXt−2 + uXt−1
]
+ uXt
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2XXt−2 + ρXuXt−1 + uXt
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2X
[
(1− ρX)X + ρXXt−3 + uXt−2
]
+ ρXu
X
t−1 + u
X
t
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2X(1− ρX)X + ρ3XXt−3 + ρ2XuXt−2 + ρXuXt−1 + uXt
= . . .
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2X(1− ρX)X + . . .+ uXt + ρXuXt−1 + ρ2XuXt−2 + . . .
where X is the steady state value of Xt. Then the variance of Xt is given by
σ2X = σ
2
uX + ρ
2
Xσ
2
uX + ρ
4
Xσ
2
uX + . . . =
σ2uX
1− ρ2X
which implies the standard deviation of innovations to Xt,
σuX =
√
(1− ρ2X)σ2X
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Appendix D Algebraic steady state solution
With Assumption 2, the dynamic equilibrium of the model implies the following steady state
system.
T = τ rnrN + τwlwL (D.1)
G = T (D.2)
w = K
νγ
γ+ν ω
γ
γ+ν (1− τwl)−
γ
γ+ν [(1− γ)A]
ν
γ+ν (D.3)
L = K
γ
γ+ν ω
− 1γ+ν [(1− τwl)(1− γ)A]
1
γ+ν (D.4)
K = N (D.5)
K = I + δK (D.6)
N s = (1− pi + piφ)δN + θI (D.7)
Ci = pi(1− β)([1− τ rn]rN + [φq + (1− φ)qR]δN + pM) (D.8)
Cs = (1− pi)(1− β)([1− τ rn]rN + qδN + pM) (D.9)
Cw = (1− τwl)wL (D.10)
C = Ci + Cs + Cw (D.11)
pi
 1−
(
[1−τrn]r+φδq+[1−φ]δqR
q
)
[1− τ rn]rN s + [φq + (1− φ)qR]δN s + pM

= (1− pi)

(
[1−τrn]r+δq
q
)
− 1
[1− τ rn]rN s + qδN s + pM
 (D.12)
(1− θq)I = ([1− τ rn]r + φδq)piN + pipM − Ci (D.13)
rK = Y − wL (D.14)
r = aKα−1 (D.15)
Y = C + I +G (D.16)
qR =
1− θq
1− θ (D.17)
a = γ
[
(1− γ)(1− τwl)
ω
] 1−γ
ν+γ
A
1+ν
ν+γ (D.18)
To simplify the notation, let
Σ =
1− φ
1− θ
which gives
(1− φ)qR = (1− θq)Σ (D.19)
Substituting Equations (D.8) to (D.10) into Equation (D.11),
C = pi(1− β)([1− τ rn]rN + [φq + (1− φ)qR]δN + pM)
+ (1− pi)(1− β)([1− τ rn]rN + qδN + pM) + (1− τwl)wL
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= (1− β)
[
(1− τ rn)r + piφδq + pi(1− φ)δqR + (1− pi)δq
]
N + (1− β)pM + (1− τwl)wL
= (1− β)
[
(1− τ rn)r + (1− pi + piφ)δq + pi(1− φ)δqR
]
N + (1− β)pM + (1− τwl)wL
(D.20)
Substituting Equation (D.1) into Equation (D.2),
G = τ rnrN + τwlwL (D.21)
From Equations (D.5) and (D.6),
I = (1− δ)N (D.22)
Then substituting Equations (D.19) to (D.22) into Equation (D.16),
Y = (1− β)
[
(1− τ rn)r + (1− pi + piφ)δq + pi(1− θq)δΣ
]
N + (1− β)pM + (1− τwl)wL
+ (1− δ)N + τ rnrN + τwlwL
=
[
(1− β)[(1− τ rn)r + (1− pi + piφ)δq + pi(1− θq)δΣ] + 1− δ + τ rnr
]
N
+ (1− β)pM + wL (D.23)
Substituting Equation (D.22) into Equation (D.7),
N s = [(1− pi + piφ)δ + θ(1− δ)]N
which is written compactly as
N s = χN (D.24)
where
χ = (1− pi + piφ)δ + θ(1− δ)
Substituting Equations (D.8), (D.19) and (D.22) into Equation (D.13),
(1− θq)(1− δ)N = ([1− τ rn]r + φδq)piN + pipM
− pi(1− β)([1− τ rn]rN + [φq + (1− θq)Σ]δN + pM)
= pi(1− τ rn)rN + piφδqN + pipM − pi(1− β)(1− τ rn)rN − pi(1− β)φδqN
− pi(1− β)(1− θq)δΣN − pi(1− β)pM
= pi(1− τ rn)rN − pi(1− β)(1− τ rn)rN + piφδqN − pi(1− β)φδqN
− pi(1− β)(1− θq)δΣN + pipM − pi(1− β)pM
= [piβ(1− τ rn)r + piβφδq − pi(1− β)(1− θq)δΣ]N + piβpM
=⇒ (1− δ)− (1− δ)θq = piβ(1− τ rn)r + piβφδq − pi(1− β)(1− θq)δΣ+ piβ
[
pM
N
]
= piβ(1− τ rn)r + piβφδq − pi(1− β)δΣ+ pi(1− β)θδΣq + piβ
[
pM
N
]
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=⇒ [(1− δ)θ + piβφδ + pi(1− β)θδΣ]q = 1− δ + pi(1− β)δΣ− piβ(1− τ rn)r − piβ
[
pM
N
]
(D.25)
From Equations (D.5) and (D.14),
wL = Y − rN
which when substituted into Equation (D.23), re-states the goods market clearing condition as
rN =
[
(1− β)[(1− τ rn)r + (1− pi + piφ)δq + pi(1− θq)δΣ] + 1− δ + τ rnr
]
N + (1− β)pM
=⇒ r = (1− β)
[
(1− τ rn)r + (1− pi + piφ)δq + pi(1− θq)δΣ
]
+ 1− δ + τ rnr + (1− β)
[
pM
N
]
=⇒ [1− (1− β)(1− τ rn)− τ rn]r = (1− β)(1− pi + piφ)δq + pi(1− β)(1− θq)δΣ
+ 1− δ + (1− β)
[
pM
N
]
=⇒ β(1− τ rn)r = 1− δ + pi(1− β)δΣ+ (1− β)(1− pi + piφ− piθΣ)δq + (1− β)
[
pM
N
]
(D.26)
The numerator on the LHS of the portfolio balance equation (D.12) simplifies as
pi
[
1−
(
[1− τ rn]r + φδq + (1− θq)δΣ
q
)]
= pi[q − ([1− τ rn]r + φδq + (1− θq)δΣ)]÷ q
= pi[q − (1− τ rn)r − φδq − (1− θq)δΣ]÷ q
= pi[(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − (1− τ rn)r − δΣ]÷ q
= [pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ]÷ q
and the RHS numerator simplifies as
(1− pi)
[(
[1− τ rn]r + δq
q
)
− 1
]
= (1− pi)[(1− τ rn)r + δq − q]÷ q
= (1− pi)[(1− τ rn)r − (1− δ)q]÷ q
= [(1− pi)(1− τ rn)r − (1− pi)(1− δ)q]÷ q
Then the portfolio balance equation becomes
pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ
(1− τ rn)rN s + φδqN s + (1− θq)ΣδN s + pM =
(1− pi)(1− τ rn)r − (1− pi)(1− δ)q
(1− τ rn)rN s + qδN s + pM
=⇒
[
pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ
][
(1− τ rn)rN s + qδN s + pM
]
=
[
(1− pi)(1− τ rn)r − (1− pi)(1− δ)q
][
(1− τ rn)rN s + φδqN s + (1− θq)ΣδN s + pM
]
The expression on the LHS simplifies as follows:[
pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ
][
(1− τ rn)rN s + qδN s + pM
]
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=[
pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ
]
(1− τ rn)rN s
+
[
pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ
]
qδN s
+
[
pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q − pi(1− τ rn)r − piδΣ
]
pM
= pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s − pi(1− τ rn)2r2N s − piδΣ(1− τ rn)rN s
+ pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)q2δN s − pi(1− τ rn)rqδN s − piδΣqδN s
+ pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)qpM − pi(1− τ rn)rpM − piδΣpM
= pi(1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s − pi(1− τ rn)2r2N s − piδΣ(1− τ rn)rN s
+ pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)δq2N s − piδ2ΣqN s + pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)qpM − pi(1− τ rn)rpM − piδΣpM
and the expression on the RHS simplifies as:[
(1− pi)(1− τ rn)r − (1− pi)(1− δ)q
][
(1− τ rn)rN s + φδqN s + (1− θq)ΣδN s + pM
]
= (1− pi)(1− τ rn)r
[
(1− τ rn)rN s + φδqN s + δΣN s − θδΣqN s + pM
]
− (1− pi)(1− δ)q
[
(1− τ rn)rN s + φδqN s + δΣN s − θδΣqN s + pM
]
= (1− pi)(1− τ rn)2r2N s + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)φδrqN s + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)δΣrN s
− (1− pi)(1− τ rn)θδΣrqN s + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)rpM − (1− pi)(1− δ)(1− τ rn)rqN s
− (1− pi)(1− δ)φδq2N s − (1− pi)(1− δ)δΣqN s + (1− pi)(1− δ)θδΣq2N s − (1− pi)(1− δ)qpM
= (1− pi)(−1 + δ + φδ − θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)2r2N s + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)δΣrN s
+ (1− pi)(1− δ)δ(θΣ− φ)q2N s − (1− pi)(1− δ)δΣqN s − (1− pi)(1− δ)qpM
+ (1− pi)(1− τ rn)rpM
The portfolio balance equation now becomes
pi(1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s − pi(1− τ rn)2r2N s − piδΣ(1− τ rn)rN s
+ pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)δq2N s − piδ2ΣqN s + pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)qpM − pi(1− τ rn)rpM − piδΣpM
= (1− pi)(−1 + δ + φδ − θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)2r2N s
+ (1− pi)(1− τ rn)δΣrN s + (1− pi)(1− δ)δ(θΣ− φ)q2N s − (1− pi)(1− δ)δΣqN s
− (1− pi)(1− δ)qpM + (1− pi)(1− τ rn)rpM
=⇒ 0 = pi(1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s − pi(1− τ rn)2r2N s − piδΣ(1− τ rn)rN s
+ pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)δq2N s − piδ2ΣqN s + pi(1− φδ + θδΣ)qpM − pi(1− τ rn)rpM
− piδΣpM − (1− pi)(−1 + δ + φδ − θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s − (1− pi)(1− τ rn)2r2N s
− (1− pi)(1− τ rn)δΣrN s − (1− pi)(1− δ)δ(θΣ− φ)q2N s + (1− pi)(1− δ)δΣqN s
+ (1− pi)(1− δ)qpM − (1− pi)(1− τ rn)rpM
= (1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)rqN s − (1− τ rn)2r2N s − δΣ(1− τ rn)rN s
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+ (pi + φ− piφ− φδ − θΣ+ piθΣ+ θδΣ)δq2N s + (1− pi − δ)δΣqN s
+ (1− δ + piδ − piφδ + piθδΣ)qpM − (1− τ rn)rpM − piδΣpM
Finally, substituting Equation (D.24), and then dividing throughout by N ,
0 = (1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)qrχN − (1− τ rn)2r2χN − δΣ(1− τ rn)rχN
+ (pi + φ− piφ− φδ − θΣ+ piθΣ+ θδΣ)δq2χN + (1− pi − δ)δΣqχN
+ (1− δ + piδ − piφδ + piθδΣ)qpM − (1− τ rn)rpM − piδΣpM
= χ(pi + φ− piφ− φδ − θΣ+ piθΣ+ θδΣ)δq2 − χ(1− τ rn)2r2 + χ(1− pi − δ)δΣq
− χ(1− τ rn)δΣr − piδΣ
[
pM
N
]
+ χ(1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)qr
− (1− τ rn)
[
pM
N
]
r + (1− δ + piδ − piφδ + piθδΣ)
[
pM
N
]
q (D.27)
Equations (D.25) to (D.27) form a system of 3 equations with 3 unknowns, q, r, and pM/N ,
which is compactly expressed as
Γq1q + Γr1r + Γs1s = Γ01 (D.28)
Γq2q + Γr2r + Γs2s = Γ02 (D.29)
Γqq3q
2 + Γrr3r
2 + Γq3q + Γr3r + Γs3s+ Γqr3qr + Γrs3rs+ Γqs3qs = 0 (D.30)
where
s =
pM
N
Γq1 = (1− δ)θ + piβφδ + pi(1− β)θδΣ
Γq2 = −(1− β)(1− pi + piφ− piθΣ)δ
Γr1 = piβ(1− τ rn)
Γr2 = β(1− τ rn)
Γs1 = piβ
Γs2 = −(1− β)
Γ01 = 1− δ + pi(1− β)δΣ
Γ02 = 1− δ + pi(1− β)δΣ
Γqq3 = χ(pi + φ− piφ− φδ − θΣ+ piθΣ+ θδΣ)δ
Γrr3 = −χ(1− τ rn)2
Γq3 = χ(1− pi − δ)δΣ
Γr3 = −χ(1− τ rn)δΣ
Γs3 = −piδΣ
Γqr3 = χ(1− δ − φδ + θδΣ)(1− τ rn)
Γrs3 = −(1− τ rn)
Γqs3 = 1− δ + piδ − piφδ + piθδΣ
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Since Γ01 = Γ02 then equating Equations (D.28) and (D.29) gives
Γq1q + Γr1r + Γs1s = Γq2q + Γr2r + Γs2s
Notice that Γr1 = piΓr2. Then the equation above becomes
Γq1q + piΓr2r + Γs1s = Γq2q + Γr2r + Γs2s
=⇒ (Γq1 − Γq2)q − (1− pi)Γr2r + (Γs1 − Γs2)s = 0
=⇒ r =
[
Γq1 − Γq2
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q +
[
Γs1 − Γs2
(1− pi)Γr2
]
s (D.31)
Substituting Equation (D.31) into Equation (D.28) gives a linear relationship between s and q,
Γq1q + Γr1
([
Γq1 − Γq2
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q +
[
Γs1 − Γs2
(1− pi)Γr2
]
s
)
+ Γs1s = Γ01
=⇒
[
Γq1 +
(Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q +
[
Γs1 +
(Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
s = Γ01
=⇒
[
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q +
[
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
s = Γ01
=⇒
[
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
s = Γ01 −
[
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q
=⇒ s = Γ01
[
(1− pi)Γr2
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
−
[
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2
]
×[
(1− pi)Γr2
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
q
=
[
(1− pi)Γr2Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
−
[
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
q (D.32)
which is written compactly as
s = s0 + s1q (D.33)
where
s0 =
(1− pi)Γr2Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
s1 = −(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
Substituting Equation (D.32) into Equation (D.31) gives a linear relationship between r and q,
r =
[
Γq1 − Γq2
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q +
[
Γs1 − Γs2
(1− pi)Γr2
]([
(1− pi)Γr2Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
−
[
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
q
)
=
[
Γq1 − Γq2
(1− pi)Γr2
]
q +
[
Γs1 − Γs2
(1− pi)Γr2
] [
(1− pi)Γr2Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
−
[
Γs1 − Γs2
(1− pi)Γr2
] [
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
q
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= [Γq1 − Γq2]
[
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
− (Γs1 − Γs2)
[
(1− pi)Γq1Γr2 + (Γq1 − Γq2)Γr1
]
(1− pi)Γr2
[
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
 q
+
[
(Γs1 − Γs2)Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
=

(1− pi)Γq1Γr2Γs1 + Γq1Γr1Γs1 − Γq1Γr1Γs2 − (1− pi)Γq2Γr2Γs1 − Γq2Γr1Γs1 + Γq2Γr1Γs2
−(1− pi)Γq1Γr2Γs1 − Γq1Γr1Γs1 + Γq2Γr1Γs1 + (1− pi)Γq1Γr2Γs2 + Γq1Γr1Γs2 − Γq2Γr1Γs2
(1− pi)2Γ2r2Γs1 + (1− pi)Γr1Γr2Γs1 − (1− pi)Γr1Γr2Γs2
 q
+
[
(Γs1 − Γs2)Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
=
[ −(1− pi)Γq2Γr2Γs1 + (1− pi)Γq1Γr2Γs2
(1− pi)2Γ2r2Γs1 + (1− pi)Γr1Γr2Γs1 − (1− pi)Γr1Γr2Γs2
]
q +
[
(Γs1 − Γs2)Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
=
[
Γq1Γs2 − Γq2Γs1
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
q +
[
(Γs1 − Γs2)Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
]
(D.34)
which is written compactly as
r = r0 + r1q (D.35)
where
r0 =
(Γs1 − Γs2)Γ01
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
r1 =
Γq1Γs2 − Γq2Γs1
(1− pi)Γr2Γs1 + (Γs1 − Γs2)Γr1
Finally, substituting Equations (D.33) and (D.35) into Equation (D.30) gives a quadratic in q,
0 = Γqq3q
2 + Γrr3(r0 + r1q)
2 + Γq3q + Γr3(r0 + r1q) + Γs3(s0 + s1q) + Γqr3q(r0 + r1q)
+ Γrs3(r0 + r1q)(s0 + s1q) + Γqs3q(s0 + s1q)
= Γqq3q
2 + Γrr3(r
2
0 + 2r0r1q + r
2
1q
2) + Γq3q + Γr3(r0 + r1q) + Γs3(s0 + s1q) + Γqr3(r0q + r1q
2)
+ Γrs3(r0s0 + r0s1q + r1s0q + r1s1q
2) + Γqs3(s0q + s1q
2)
=
[
Γqq3 + Γrr3r
2
1 + Γqr3r1 + Γrs3r1s1 + Γqs3s1
]
q2 +
[
2Γrr3r0r1 + Γq3 + Γr3r1 + Γs3s1 + Γqr3r0
+ Γrs3r0s1 + Γrs3r1s0 + Γqs3s0
]
q +
[
Γrr3r
2
0 + Γr3r0 + Γs3s0 + Γrs3r0s0
]
= µ2q
2 + µ1q + µ0
which has solutions
q′ =
−µ1 +
√
µ21 − 4µ0µ2
2µ2
q′′ =
−µ1 −
√
µ21 − 4µ0µ2
2µ2
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where
µ2 = Γqq3 + Γrr3r
2
1 + Γqr3r1 + Γrs3r1s1 + Γqs3s1
µ1 = 2Γrr3r0r1 + Γq3 + Γr3r1 + Γs3s1 + Γqr3r0 + Γrs3r0s1 + Γrs3r1s0 + Γqs3s0
µ0 = Γrr3r
2
0 + Γr3r0 + Γs3s0 + Γrs3r0s0
By Assumption 1, if only one root is greater than 1, then this root is taken as the steady
state value of q; if both roots are greater than 1 then the smaller value is used. The steady
state values of r and s are obtained from Equation (D.35) and Equation (D.33), respectively.
Steady state values {A,φ,Ng,M, τ rn, τwl} for the model’s exogenous parameters are assumed
given. With these, together with values of q, r, and s, the steady state values of the model’s
other endogenous variables are easily obtained. Firstly, Equations (D.17) and (D.18) provide
qR and a. Then from Equation (D.15),
K =
(r
a
) 1
1−α
which is also the value of N , by Equation (D.5). N s comes from Equation (D.24) and p follows
from the definition of s, i.e.
p =
sN
M
Next, w and L are delivered by Equations (D.3) and (D.4), respectively. Finally, the other
variables {T,G, I, Ci, Cs, Cw, C, Y } are calculated from equations (D.1), (D.2), (D.22), (D.8),
(D.9), (D.10), (D.11), and (D.16), respectively.
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Appendix E Data
Table 10: US liquid assets, capital and liquidity
Year
Federal government
liabilities ($b)
Capital ($b) Liquidity share
1945 262.4 471.0 0.3578
1946 238.4 544.9 0.3044
1947 230.1 635.3 0.2659
1948 222.6 701.2 0.2410
1949 222.3 736.0 0.2320
1950 221.2 830.6 0.2103
1951 222.3 928.2 0.1932
1952 229.1 962.1 0.1923
1953 231.1 992.8 0.1888
1954 232.1 1076.3 0.1774
1955 233.6 1188.9 0.1642
1956 228.8 1281.4 0.1515
1957 228.6 1314.0 0.1482
1958 235.2 1434.0 0.1409
1959 245.3 1516.4 0.1392
1960 242.1 1574.6 0.1333
1961 248.2 1700.8 0.1273
1962 253.7 1748.3 0.1267
1963 258.4 1842.1 0.1230
1964 264.1 1999.5 0.1167
1965 264.8 2166.2 0.1089
1966 268.7 2223.8 0.1078
1967 274.6 2498.9 0.0990
1968 281.4 2822.1 0.0907
1969 285.8 2863.0 0.0908
1970 302.4 3008.0 0.0913
1971 333.3 3344.2 0.0906
1972 349.5 3846.3 0.0833
1973 357.0 4042.8 0.0811
1974 377.8 4028.0 0.0858
1975 476.2 4722.8 0.0916
1976 553.2 5327.2 0.0941
1977 611.9 5856.7 0.0946
1978 673.0 6672.2 0.0916
1979 723.4 7787.0 0.0850
Continued on next page
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Table 10: Continued from previous page
Year
Federal government
liabilities ($b)
Capital ($b) Liquidity share
1980 823.6 8982.0 0.0840
1981 923.7 9604.3 0.0877
1982 1101.3 10189.0 0.0975
1983 1290.9 10797.8 0.1068
1984 1501.1 11513.4 0.1153
1985 1744.1 12817.3 0.1198
1986 1971.5 13990.6 0.1235
1987 2109.7 14846.2 0.1244
1988 2242.7 16078.1 0.1224
1989 2404.1 17644.1 0.1199
1990 2671.6 17957.5 0.1295
1991 2985.2 19099.8 0.1352
1992 3276.6 19871.3 0.1416
1993 3543.3 20763.5 0.1458
1994 3710.8 21282.3 0.1485
1995 3868.4 23449.4 0.1416
1996 4048.2 24326.8 0.1427
1997 4097.7 27323.9 0.1304
1998 4089.8 30781.4 0.1173
1999 4232.4 35528.9 0.1064
2000 3808.8 35541.3 0.0968
2001 3855.5 35844.0 0.0971
2002 4118.6 35308.8 0.1045
2003 4549.1 40199.5 0.1017
2004 4930.0 45337.8 0.0981
2005 5273.5 50847.9 0.0940
2006 5475.2 54131.2 0.0919
2007 5797.3 54116.5 0.0968
2008 8980.9 45001.9 0.1664
2009 9990.4 44224.8 0.1843
2010 11707.4 46010.2 0.2028
2011 12444.2 46217.6 0.2121
Average: 1957 - 2007 0.1110
Standard deviation: 1957 - 2007 0.0204
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, US Flow of Funds Statistics, various issues; 2012
data is obtained online from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf, and historical
data from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm.
NOTES: The liquidity share is calculated according to Del Negro et al. (2011). Table 11 gives the metadata.
The liquidity share is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.
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Table 11: Liquidity share measure: metadata
Item
Flow of Funds Statistics
reference
Liabilities of the federal government
T-bills Table L.105, line 21
Treasury securities Table L.105, line 22
Less: Holdings by the monetary authority Table L.108, line 12
Less: Holdings by the budgetary agency Table L.105, line 23
Reserves Table L.108, line 32
Vault cash Table L.108, line 33
Currency Table L.108, line 34
Currency outside banks Table L.108, line 41
Less: Remittances to the federal government Table L.108, line 35
Capital (at market value)
Capital owned by households:
Real estate Table B.100, line 3
Equipment and software of non-profit organisations Table B.100, line 6
Consumer durables Table B.100, line 7
Capital owned by the non-corporate sector:
Real estate Table B.103, line 3
Equipment and software Table B.103, line 6
Inventories Table B.103, line 9
Capital owned by the corporate sector:
Equity outstanding, market value Table B.102, line 35
Liabilities Table B.102, line 21
Less: Financial assets Table B.102, line 6
Less: Government credit market instruments Table F.105c, line 33
Less: Trade receivables Table F.105c, line 43
NOTES: This table follows from the appendix of Del Negro et al. (2011).
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Table 12: US federal government’s corporate equity holdings
Period Equities ($m) ln(Equities)
2008:4 188,676 12.15
2009:1 223,856 12.32
2009:2 157,566 11.97
2009:3 158,847 11.98
2009:4 67,351 11.12
2010:1 50,234 10.82
2010:2 49,613 10.81
2010:3 50,814 10.84
2010:4 49,928 10.82
2011:1 62,137 11.04
2011:2 65,961 11.10
2011:3 59,282 10.99
2011:4 57,813 10.96
2012:1 48,156 10.78
2012:2 43,618 10.68
2012:3 41,134 10.62
Standard deviation 0.5671
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, US Flow of Funds Accounts, Table L.105, line 11.
NOTES: Equities represent those purchased by the US government from financial corporations under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program. They are valued at market prices.
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Table 13: US real monetary base
Period M1 ($b) CPI CPI, s.a. Real M1 ln (real M1)
ln (real M1),
detrended
1987Q1 730.2 111.200 111.4902 6.549456 1.879382 1.794665
1987Q2 743.9 112.700 112.6327 6.604653 1.887774 1.805112
1987Q3 743.0 113.800 113.6317 6.538671 1.877734 1.814580
1987Q4 756.2 115.300 115.1649 6.566237 1.881941 1.823065
1988Q1 756.2 115.700 116.0019 6.518858 1.874699 1.830602
1988Q2 768.1 117.100 117.0301 6.563269 1.881489 1.837261
1988Q3 781.4 118.500 118.3247 6.603862 1.887655 1.843141
1988Q4 783.3 120.200 120.0592 6.524284 1.875531 1.848370
1989Q1 785.7 121.100 121.4160 6.471140 1.867352 1.853101
1989Q2 779.2 123.100 123.0265 6.333595 1.845868 1.857505
1989Q3 777.8 124.400 124.2160 6.261675 1.834448 1.861763
1989Q4 786.6 125.600 125.4528 6.270086 1.835790 1.866049
1990Q1 795.4 127.400 127.7324 6.227079 1.828907 1.870516
1990Q2 806.1 128.900 128.8230 6.257421 1.833768 1.875304
1990Q3 810.1 130.400 130.2071 6.221627 1.828031 1.880521
1990Q4 819.9 133.500 133.3436 6.148778 1.816253 1.886255
1991Q1 827.2 134.600 134.9512 6.129622 1.813133 1.892556
1991Q2 843.1 135.200 135.1193 6.239672 1.830928 1.899433
1991Q3 861.6 136.200 135.9985 6.335363 1.846147 1.906845
1991Q4 878.0 137.400 137.2390 6.397598 1.855923 1.914708
1992Q1 910.4 138.100 138.4604 6.575167 1.883300 1.922900
1992Q2 943.8 139.500 139.4167 6.769633 1.912447 1.931262
1992Q3 963.3 140.500 140.2922 6.866385 1.926638 1.939612
1992Q4 1003.7 141.800 141.6338 7.086583 1.958203 1.947752
1993Q1 1030.4 142.600 142.9721 7.207000 1.975053 1.955481
1993Q2 1047.7 144.000 143.9140 7.280041 1.985136 1.962601
1993Q3 1084.5 144.400 144.1864 7.521514 2.017768 1.968929
1993Q4 1112.9 145.700 145.5293 7.647259 2.034347 1.974292
1994Q1 1131.6 146.200 146.5815 7.719937 2.043806 1.978553
1994Q2 1141.1 147.400 147.3120 7.746144 2.047195 1.981607
1994Q3 1150.6 148.400 148.1805 7.764856 2.049608 1.983394
1994Q4 1150.1 149.500 149.3248 7.702001 2.041480 1.983893
1995Q1 1151.5 150.300 150.6922 7.641404 2.033581 1.983124
1995Q2 1149.2 151.900 151.8093 7.570023 2.024196 1.981144
1995Q3 1145.4 152.500 152.2744 7.521947 2.017825 1.978043
1995Q4 1137.3 153.700 153.5199 7.408160 2.002582 1.973933
1996Q1 1123.5 154.400 154.8029 7.257616 1.982051 1.968957
Continued on next page
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Table 13: Continued from previous page
Period M1 ($b) CPI CPI, s.a. Real M1 ln (real M1)
ln (real M1),
detrended
1996Q2 1124.8 156.300 156.2067 7.200716 1.974180 1.963272
1996Q3 1112.4 157.000 156.7677 7.095847 1.959510 1.957043
1996Q4 1086.3 158.300 158.1145 6.870337 1.927213 1.950445
1997Q1 1081.3 159.100 159.5152 6.778666 1.913780 1.943650
1997Q2 1064.0 160.200 160.1044 6.645666 1.893965 1.936820
1997Q3 1066.3 160.500 160.2626 6.653456 1.895136 1.930096
1997Q4 1065.6 161.600 161.4106 6.601795 1.887342 1.923592
1998Q1 1074.2 161.600 162.0217 6.629976 1.891601 1.917401
1998Q2 1076.7 162.500 162.4030 6.629804 1.891575 1.911592
1998Q3 1075.0 163.200 162.9586 6.596768 1.886580 1.906220
1998Q4 1086.1 164.000 163.8078 6.630330 1.891655 1.901327
1999Q1 1097.4 164.300 164.7287 6.661861 1.896399 1.896941
1999Q2 1102.0 166.200 166.1008 6.634527 1.892287 1.893085
1999Q3 1098.5 166.700 166.4534 6.599445 1.886986 1.889782
1999Q4 1102.2 168.200 168.0029 6.560601 1.881082 1.887054
2000Q1 1121.6 168.800 169.2405 6.627256 1.891191 1.884922
2000Q2 1114.6 171.300 171.1977 6.510600 1.873432 1.883403
2000Q3 1102.8 172.800 172.5444 6.391399 1.854953 1.882516
2000Q4 1098.7 174.000 173.7961 6.321775 1.844000 1.882278
2001Q1 1097.1 175.100 175.5569 6.249255 1.832462 1.882684
2001Q2 1116.1 176.900 176.7944 6.312983 1.842608 1.883708
2001Q3 1139.0 177.500 177.2374 6.426408 1.860416 1.885292
2001Q4 1166.2 177.700 177.4918 6.570445 1.882582 1.887352
2002Q1 1191.3 177.100 177.5621 6.709201 1.903480 1.889789
2002Q2 1187.7 179.800 179.6927 6.609619 1.888526 1.892500
2002Q3 1199.8 180.100 179.8336 6.671724 1.897878 1.895392
2002Q4 1204.7 181.300 181.0876 6.652583 1.895005 1.898369
2003Q1 1227.1 181.700 182.1741 6.735863 1.907446 1.901336
2003Q2 1250.3 183.800 183.6903 6.806566 1.917888 1.904195
2003Q3 1288.3 183.900 183.6280 7.015816 1.948167 1.906854
2003Q4 1297.3 185.000 184.7832 7.020659 1.948857 1.909229
2004Q1 1306.0 185.200 185.6833 7.033482 1.950682 1.911261
2004Q2 1333.2 188.000 187.8878 7.095726 1.959493 1.912916
2004Q3 1340.6 189.400 189.1198 7.088628 1.958492 1.914185
2004Q4 1360.7 190.900 190.6763 7.136177 1.965177 1.915088
2005Q1 1366.4 190.700 191.1976 7.146532 1.966627 1.915672
2005Q2 1358.2 194.600 194.4838 6.983614 1.943567 1.916017
Continued on next page
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Table 13: Continued from previous page
Period M1 ($b) CPI CPI, s.a. Real M1 ln (real M1)
ln (real M1),
detrended
2005Q3 1366.9 195.400 195.1109 7.005758 1.946732 1.916233
2005Q4 1375.4 199.200 198.9666 6.912718 1.933363 1.916448
2006Q1 1379.6 198.300 198.8175 6.939028 1.937162 1.916809
2006Q2 1380.9 201.500 201.3797 6.857196 1.925299 1.917474
2006Q3 1369.8 203.500 203.1990 6.741176 1.908234 1.918612
2006Q4 1370.2 201.800 201.5635 6.797856 1.916607 1.920401
2007Q1 1372.6 202.416 202.9442 6.763435 1.911531 1.923007
2007Q2 1378.1 206.686 206.5626 6.671585 1.897857 1.926597
2007Q3 1368.8 208.299 207.9909 6.581058 1.884196 1.931331
2007Q4 1379.7 208.936 208.6912 6.611204 1.888766 1.937350
2008Q1 1379.2 211.080 211.6308 6.517010 1.874416 1.944766
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Bureau of Labour Statistics.
NOTES: Nominal, seasonally adjusted base money, or M1, is obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; the data represents the stock at the end of the quarter. The all-items, all urban consumers,
US city average CPI (1982-84 = 100) is obtained from the Bureau of Labour Statistics. The CPI is seasonally
adjusted by the multiplicative moving average method. M1 is deflated by the seasonally adjusted CPI to obtain
real M1. The natural logarithm of real M1 is detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Table 14: UK taxpayers’ earnings and tax liabilities
Tax year
Earnings (£m) Tax liabilities (£m)
Tax liabilities
Earnings
Wages Dividends Wages Dividends Wages Dividends
1999-00 382,000 18,300 87,650 3,670 0.229 0.201
2000-01 431,500 20,800 98,580 3,900 0.228 0.188
2001-02 444,900 19,400 102,030 4,053 0.229 0.209
2002-03 451,600 20,800 103,900 4,330 0.230 0.208
2003-04 449,000 25,400 103,100 5,290 0.230 0.208
2004-05 496,000 32,600 113,860 6,070 0.230 0.186
2005-06 539,000 37,100 125,640 7,790 0.233 0.210
2006-07 573,000 41,500 135,370 9,000 0.236 0.217
2007-08 611,000 45,700 145,720 9,950 0.238 0.218
2008-09 n.a. n.a. 142,000 9,380 n.a. n.a.
2009-10 614,000 50,000 139,100 10,910 0.227 0.218
2010-11 616,000 36,100 138,600 7,700 0.225 0.213
Average 0.231 0.207
Standard deviation 0.0040 0.0112
Source: HM Revenue and Customs. UK taxpayers’ earnings from employment and UK dividends were obtained
from HM Revenue and Customs (2012b), Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. Data for the tax year 2008-09 is not
available. Income tax liabilities on earnings and dividends are obtained from HM Revenue and Customs (2012a),
Table 2.6. Older issues of these publications are obtained online at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/20120609144700/http://hmrc.gov.uk/stats/income_tax/table2-6a.pdf and http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http://hmrc.gov.uk/stats/income_distribution/menu-by-year.htm.
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